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"CHINA CASTS A GIANT SHADOW"
THE DEVELOPING WORLD CONFRONTS TRADE
LIBERALIZATION AND THE END OF QUOTAS IN THE
GARMENT INDUSTRY
Dr. John A. Hall'
The US$500 billion international trade in textiles and garments - what
I will refer to in this paper generally as the garment industry - and in particular
the recent elimination of a protectionist system of quotas and its replacement
with a more liberalized trade environment, offers the opportunity for a casestudy of the nature, direction and implications of globalization in the Twentyfirst century. This paper will examine how the special treatment of garment and
textiles in international trade law - particularly the thirty-year system of quotas
- fostered the spread of apparel manufacturing throughout the developing world.
The apparel factories, located in all regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America,
have come to provide employment for millions of women who are frequently
the sole wage earners for their families. Though criticized as "sweatshops" and
sources of worker exploitation, in many instances the apparel factories offer the
only viable alternative to extreme poverty for their workers. Currently there are
an estimated 40 million people around the world working in the garment and
textile industries, accounting for 14 percent of global employment. 2 In addition,
the export apparel sector has grown to become a vital cornerstone of many
national economies. Through the system of quotas, even those nations which
were less efficient and less competitive could flourish and build a successful
export trade, as importing nations selectively chose which producing nations
would be offered preferential access to their restricted markets. In this way, the
economies of many poorer nations could develop in an environment largely
protected from the harsh realities of truly unfettered global competition.

1 Assistant Professor,

Chapman University School of Law; Research Fellow, Institute for Global
Trade and Development. B.A., Sussex University; D.Phil., Oxford University; J.D., Stanford Law
School. Dr. Hall would like to thank Professors Tim Canova, Ernesto Hernandez and Matthew
Parlow for commenting on drafts of this paper, and Kristin Koenig, Jason Murai, Neetal Parekh, and
Elsa Sham of Chapman University School of Law.
2 NATIONAL LABOR COMMITTEE, ELIMINATION OF TEXTILE AND APPAREL QUOTAS IN 2005 WILL
SHOCK THE DEVELOPING WORLD, I (Sept. 2004), at
http://www.nlcnet.org/news/public/files.upload/quotas2005_en.pdf (last visited March 26, 2006).
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By 2004, global textile and apparel exports were just short of US$500
billion a year, in spite of the artificial restraints resulting from the quotasystem. 3 Some estimates are that the ending of quotas will result in an
expansion of total garment exports to US$1,200 billion by 2010. 4 Despite this
projected expansion in the size of the global market, there is reason to believe
that there may be a fundamental shift in the pattern of international production. 5
Indeed, the very notion of a truly global system of garment production may be
in doubt.6 With the eradication of the quota system on January 1, 2005, which
ushered-in a new era of trade liberalization, there is reason to believe that China
- and to a lesser extent India - will come to dominate worldwide apparel and
textile manufacturing. 7 The result of a rapid global shift in production could be
catastrophic for developing nations overwhelmed by Chinese competition.
Much of the manufacturing capacity encouraged throughout the developing
world during the last three decades - and with it the crucial employment and
state revenues in dozens of countries - may simply evaporate.8
GLOBALIZATION:
For some, the prospect of apparel and textile manufacturing spreading
throughout the world offered a panacea for the host of problems facing poorer
nations. They pointed, for example, to the encouragement and creation of a
textile and apparel industry in developing countries as a key element in the
"trade not aid" reorientation of the relationship between the developed and
emerging nations. 9 Importing companies in the developed world came to see
the developing nations as a new source for low-cost textile and clothing
3 Kaushik Basu, Winners and Losers in Textile Shake-up, BBC News, 2 March 2005.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/4294679.stm (last visited March 26. 2006).
4 Id.
5 See Ellen Israel Rosen, The Wal-Mart Effect: The World Trade Organization and the Race to the
Bottom, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 261, 265 (2005) ("It is likely that the inevitable efforts by retailers,
including Wal-Mart, to take advantage of the new no-quota rule, means that clothing production
will move to countries that can produce the largest volume of apparel for the lowest cost.")
6 See NATIONAL LABOR COMMITTEE, supra note 2 (The U.S. Association of Importers of Textile
and Apparel has predicted that its members will "react to the WTO's lifting of quotas ... by slashing
the number countries they source production in from 50 today to just five or six countries by
2007.")
7 Jenny Strasburg, American Shoppers Could Find Wider Selections; Flood ofChina-made
Garments MeansJob Lossesfor Millions in Other Countries, S.F. CHRON, Jan. 18, 2005, at A7.
8 See Rosen The Wal-Mart Effect: The World Trade Organizationand the Race to the Bottom,
supra note 5 at 265; See also, NATIONAL LABOR COMMITTEE, supra note 2 at 6.
9 Stephen E. Lamar, The Apparel Industry and African Economic Development, 30 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 601 (1999).
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imports, and the process of outsourcing apparel production to cheaper overseas
facilities gathered speed in the final decades of the Twentieth Century.10 The
apparel sector was seen by policymakers in both the developed and developing
nations as an easily reached low rung on the ladder of economic development
for the world's poorest countries, the key that would enable even the smallest
countries to participate in the global economy, and as a quick and comparatively
cheap way to generate steady industrial employment in countries with a
plentiful but largely unskilled workforce. The spread of an export-oriented
textile and garment industry to developing nations would act as a catalyst to
growth by stimulating direct foreign investment in poorer countries, fostering a
climate favorable to entrepreneurial enterprise, and creating the infrastructure
which would encourage future industrial expansion.
This positive vision of the beneficial role of the worldwide spread of
the garment and textile industries met with approval amongst those "Globalists"
who actively lauded the potential of globalization. Participation in the global
marketplace, they argued, would foster competitiveness and specialization;
would encourage development, generate wealth, and raise millions in the
developing world from poverty. The Economist, for example, has argued that:
"[A]II countries can raise their living standards through specialization and trade
• . . [Countries] gain[] from focusing on the goods in which [their] relative
advantage is greatest." i The benefit from the winning sectors should, it was
believed, more than compensate for any losses associated with those sectors in
which a country was less competitive. 12 In this way, developing countries could
take advantage of their abundant supply of cheap labor to become specialized
manufacturing centers for goods demanded by consumers in developed
economies. Indeed, it was argued, "menial manufacturing labor is the historical13
first step in developing economy's first steps toward prosperity."'
Manufacturing would offer developing countries employment opportunities for
an often unemployed or underemployed unskilled workforce at wages

'0 In 1950, 1.2 million Americans were employed in apparel manufacturing. By 2001, that number
had declined to 566,000 despite a doubling in the U.S. population. In 1989 the U.S. imported $24.5
billion in apparel; in 2001 that had risen to $63.8 billion. By the end of 2001, 83 percent of all
apparel sold in the U.S. was imported. Fred Dickey, Workers hang on by a thread, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2003.
" Nagging Doubts About the Benefits of Globalization,and a Look at the Evidence, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2004 quoted in Juan Vega, China'sEconomicAnd PoliticalClout Grows in
Latin America at the Expense of U.S. Interests, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 377, fn. 177 (2005).
12 Id.
13 Radley Balko, Sweatshops and Globalization,A WORLD CONNECTED, at
www.aworldconnected.org/article.php/525.html (last visited March 26. 2006)
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potentially far above what would otherwise be available in the local economy.
The garment industry promised eager developing nations a crucial first step - a
so-called "starter industry" - towards participation in a broader international
economy, attracting foreign investment and foreign currency and stimulating
wealth creation.' 5 Foreign consumers would in turn benefit from cheaper and
more plentiful manufactured goods.
Critics of globalization, however, were more likely to stress the
negative impact of the garment and textile industry on the workers of the
developing nations. For much of the 1990's, the term "sweatshop" was
synonymous with the worst abuses of garment and textile workers in the
developing world. 16 Critics warned that the developing world would become
little more than an easily exploited source of cheap labor producing consumer
goods for the wealthy nations; that wages would be forced ever lower in a "race
to the bottom," as manufacturers seek advantage over other low-cost producers;
that developed countries would experience a loss of unskilled jobs, exacerbating
the divide between the wealthy and the poor in those nations; and that in an
unprotected environment, smaller nations would ultimately be unable to
compete with the economies of scale of the large super producers, and the list 17of
nations that would ultimately benefit from global trade will inexorably shrink.

14Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, Two Cheersfor Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
Sept. 24, 2000, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20000924magsweatshops.html. (last visited April 23, 2006).
15Gary Gereffi, Outsourcingand ChangingPatternsof InternationalCompetition in the Apparel
Commodity Chain, I (Paper presented at the conference "Responding to Globalization: Societies,
Groups, and Individuals," Boulder Colorado, 4-7 April 2002) available at
www.colorado.edu/IBS/PEC/gradconf/papers.gereffi.html (last visited March 26, 2006) See
generally,TOMAs LARSSON, THE RACE TO THE Top: THE REAL STORY OF GLOBALIZATION, (Cato
Institute 2001); See also JOHAN NORBERG, IN DEFENCE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM, (Cato Institute

2003).
16 See for example, The Workers Rights Consortium, at http://www.workersrights.org/ (last visited
March 26, 2006); Scholars Against Sweatshop Labor, at http://www.umass.edu!peri/sasl/ (last

visited March 26, 2006); Anti-sweatshop labor (ASSL) League, at
http://www.geocities.com/whydoyoukeepdeletingme/ASSLLeague.html?20069

(last visited March

26, 2006).
17 See, for example, Press Release GA/SHC/3778, U.N. Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, Third
Committee, Delegates express Concern Over Negative Impact of GlobalizationAs Third Committee

ContinuesDebate on Social Issues, (May 10, 2004) availableat
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/gashc3778.doc.thm (last visited March 26, 2006); Press
Release, TUC Online, Why globalizationis bad newsfor millions offemale workers, June 26, 2003,
at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/26/216.html; (last visited March 26, 2006); Balko, supra

note 13.
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THE HISTORY OF APPAREL QUOTAS:
For several decades the global trade in textiles and garments received
special treatment under international trade law. As early as the 1950's, cotton
textiles were accorded special treatment, primarily because of concern in the
United States about the potential impact on domestic manufacturers of low-cost
textile imports from post-war Japan. 18 The rather narrow protectionist concerns
voiced by the U.S. which initially prompted such special treatment,
subsequently broadened into generalized U.S. and European fears about the
potential threat posed to the domestic garment and textile industry from lowcost competition from the developing world. Despite subsequent attempts by
the U.S. and Europe to protect their domestic manufacturers, however, the last
twenty years have seen a dramatic decline in the U.S. and European
manufacturing base in the face of an increasingly globalized and highly
competitive textile industry.' 9
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT):
The quota regime for the apparel industry was initially intended as a
way to protect domestic producers in developed countries from cheap textile
and apparel imports from developing countries. 20 Following on the heels of
independently negotiated agreements between various member and nonmember countries, contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) agreed that Article XIX (which provides measures to safeguard
local industries) would be significantly expanded for textiles.2' Under GATT,

18 Ellen Israel Rosen, MAKING SWEATSHOPS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE U.S. APPAREL

INDUSTRY 37-43 (University of California Press (2002).
'9 American Textile Manufacturers Institute, The China Threat to the Textile Apparel Trade Report,
July 2, 2003, available at http://www.ncto.org/textilecrisis/china.pdf (last visited March 26, 2006);
Vanessa Hua, Eliminationof Import Quotas Decimate Garment Industry, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 18,
2005; Mike Davis, CorporateGlobalization:Overseas Sweatshops Destroy U.S. Garment Industry,
Organic Consumers Association (August 25, 2004) at
http://www.organicconsumers.org/corp/sweatshops8272004.cfm. (last visited March 26, 2006)
20 Ira Kalish, Quotas End, Uncertainty Continues; Understandingthe impact of the Agreement on

Textiles and Clothing,Deloitte Research Study (2005), at 3 available at
http://wwwdeloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/ DTTDR.QuotasFeb05(1).pdf (last visited March 26,
2005).
21Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring,and the ILO: Working to Improve Conditions in Cambodia's
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all countries are required to treat their trading partners equally. 22 GATT also
placed a preference on customs tariffs over quotas. 23
THE MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT (MFA):
A series of expansions in the permitted safeguards for textiles were
negotiated over the next thirty years, culminating in the adoption of the
Multifiber Arrangement ("MFA") in 1974,24 which permitted importing
countries to place quotas on textile imports when surges in imports of particular
products threatened domestic industry.
In as much as the MFA permitted
importing nations to treat trading partners differently, and to adopt quotas in
preference to import duties, it contradicted basic GATT principles. 26 The final
extension of the MFA, in 1991-1993, permitted importing countries to impose
quotas to punish exporting countries that engaged in "trans-shipment" (shipping
textiles through a third country to take advantage of that nation's unused quota
allocation and conceal the country of origin).27
The system of quotas permitted under the MFA benefited many
developing nations in two specific ways: first, the quotas limited the growth of
those nations threatening to become "mega-producer," most notably China and
India, by permitting importing nations to place a cap on imports from specific
countries 28; and second, the quotas guaranteed a clearly quantified access to
GarmentFactories,7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 79, 88; Kitty G. Dickerson, Textile Trade: The
GATTException, 11 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM, 393, 404 (1996); Rosen, MAKING SWEATSHOPS, supra
note 18 at 37-43.
22 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 (entered into
force on Jan. 12, 1948. [hereinafter GATT]
23 GATT, art. XI.
24 Agreement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (Multifibre Agreement), Dec. 20, 1973, 25
U.S.T. 1001 (entered into force on Apr. 1, 1974); Kolben, supra note 21 at 88-9.
25 Kolben, supra note 21, at 89.
26 id.
27 Id. at 89 fn61.
28 Lamar, supranote 9, at 615.The quota system permitted under the MFA was discretionary in
nature. Importing nations could choose to impose highly restrictive quotas, somewhat restrictive
quotas, or indeed no quotas whatsoever, on each individual product line from each exporting
country. In the U.S., it was the Executive Branch which had the responsibility and flexibility to
impose quotas. Although the Executive Branch may be subject to pressure from Congress or
pressure groups, it could refrain from imposing quotas if it desired. This provided enormous
economic incentives for exporting nations to curry favor from the governments of importing
nations. Id. It was possible, therefore, for the allocation of quotas by the U.S. to have reflected
larger U.S. foreign policy and strategic objectives, enabling Washington to use quotas to reward
some nations (such as Cambodia) who were moving towards greater democratization, and those
(like the Philippines) deemed allies.
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U.S. and E.U. markets for small producers. In the case of the Philippines, for
example, a largely cottage-based textile industry in the late 1950's, which began
expanding in the 1960's, ballooned after the MFA was adopted in 1974.29 The
quotas allocated to the Philippines guaranteed access to the U.S. market for
Philippine textiles and garments, and propelled the growth of its garment
manufacturing sector. The value of garment exports grew rapidly from US$36
million in 1970, to US$2.4 billion in 2003.30 Similarly, Macao's garment
industry flourished under the MFA-regime, coming to represent 70 percent of
all Macau's exports, as Hong Kong manufacturers shifted production to Macao
to better access the restricted U.S. and EU markets.31
THE AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING AND
THE PHASE-OUT OF THE MFA QUOTAS:
Under the so-called "Uruguay Round" of WTO negotiations,
concluded in 1995, the contracting parties concluded the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing ("ATC").3 a Under the ATC, the WTO contracting parties agreed
to phase out the MFA, thereby bringing textiles back under traditional GATT
rules.
Under the ATC, MFA quotas were to be phased out progressively over
a non-extendable ten-year period. In the first stage, which began on January 1,
1995, WTO Members were required to integrate not less than 16 percent of
their 1990 imports of textiles and garments; in the second stage, beginning in
January 1998, not less than a further 17 percent was to be integrated; and in the
third stage, starting in January 2002, WTO Members were required to integrate
a further 18 percent.33 All remaining products (amounting to a maximum of 49
29

Laurent Duvillier, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU), Surviving Without

Quotas, 1 (June 26, 2006) available at
http://www.icftu.org/www/PDF/RP-GarmentReport_170605edited_260605EN.pdf (last visited
March 26, 2006)
30 Duvillier, supra note 29 at 1 citing Philippine Economic Indicators, National Economic &
Development Authority (NEDA) at http://localweb.neda.gov.ph.
31See Macao Development Strategy Study Center and Academy of Hong Kong and Macao
Economy of Guangzhou, Jinan University, The Social and Economic Impact on Macao and
Countermeasuresfor the Phasing Out of Textile and Garment Quota System in 2005, (2004) at
http://www.ipim.gov.mo/en/publication/macauimage/cover/no36_03.htm (last visited March 26,
2006). citing Philippine Economic Indicators, National Economic & Development Authority
(NEDA) at http://localweb.neda.gov.ph.
32Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, April 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 14 (entered into force on
Jan. 1, 1995).
33 Montfort Mlachila and Yongzheng Yang, The End of Textiles Quotas: A Case Study of the
Impact on Bangladesh,IMF Working Paper, WP/04/108 (2004), at 6 available at
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percent) were to be automatically integrated with the final elimination of all
quotas on January 1, 2005. 34 Products not yet integrated were subject to a
special transitional safeguard mechanism, whereby an importing country could
apply quantitative restrictions for up to three years on imports from a particular
source of supply that causes or threatens to cause serious injury to domestic
industry. After integration, regular GATT safeguards would apply. 35
In addition to this integration process, The ATC accelerated the annual
growth rates for remaining quotas: 16 percent for the first stage of the
36
agreement; 25 percent for the second stage; and 27 percent for the final stage
Further, Least Developed Countries (LDC's) could enjoy a one-stage
advancement in the acceleration of quota growth.37 Thus, while quotas were
being removed on a certain number of product lines, the remaining quotas could
be increased in the years leading up to the final elimination of the quotas. Some
exporting countries, therefore, could experience a rapid expansion in their
access to quota-restricted markets while enjoying protection from competitors
who were less successful in obtaining quota allocations.
PHASE-OUT AND THE RUN-UP TO ELIMINATION, 19942005:
The phase-out of quotas during the three stages of the ATC prior to
2005, had far less impact than the final elimination. This was primarily due to
importing nations "backloading" the quota phase-out, and retaining the most
restrictive quotas on the most valuable products until the final elimination. 38
Initially, many developing nations, who felt that their access to markets in the
U.S. and E.U. had been artificially restricted, believed that the move to a more
liberalized trading environment would benefit them. 39 This optimism, however,
began to evaporate as they watched with concern as China rapidly assumed
global dominance in manufacturing many non-textile items which were either
40
not governed by quotas or whose quotas were phased out.

http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04l08.pdf. (last visited March 26, 2006).
34id.
35 id.
36

id.

37 Id.

38 Mlachila and Yang, supranote 33, at 4.
39 Duvillier, supra note 29, at 1.
40 Press Release, National Statistics Office, Merchandise Export Performance - March 2005,

available at http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2005/ex0503tx.html (last visited March 26,
2006); Duvillier, supranote 29, at 2 fn. 4.
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In March 2004, the Istanbul Declaration was issued by the American
Textile Manufacturers' Institute (ATMI), the American Manufacturing Trade
Action Coalition (AMTAC), and the Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters'
Association (ITKIB - Istanbul Tekstil Ve Konfeksiyon Ihracatci Birlikleri). 4 1
The declaration requested that a WTO emergency conference be called on July
1, 2005, in order to discuss the possibility of extending the textile quotas until
the end of 2007.42 The Declaration was signed by textile and trade associations
from Mexico, Italy, Belgium and Austria, and was supported by trade
associations from more than ten African countries. 43 "All this has indicated,"
the China Daily reported, "that the besiegement against Chinese textile exports
may probably be intensified.""
On July 20, 2004, Mauritius became the first nation to make a formal
45
request for an emergency meeting of the WTO to discuss the ending of quotas.
Within the U.S., domestic lobbies urged the Bush administration to support the
call for a continuance of the system of apparel quotas.46 Members of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate drafted a letter to President Bush
urging him to reexamine whether textile integration should be postponed until
2008 or later.47 Among the signatories was John Kerry, Democratic Party
nominee for President, and perhaps as a result, the domestic U.S. debate over
apparel quotas became somewhat limited by the nature of the U.S. election.48 In
response to Democratic pressure, the Bush administration maintained that it
would not support calls for an extension of the quota system.
JAN. 1, 2005: THE FINAL END OF THE QUOTAS
On January 1, 2005, the garment industry changed forever, as a new
era of trade liberalization ushered in more direct and open competition between
producing nations. Did it, however, herald the profound, dramatic and sudden
collapse of the textile industry in much of the developing world that some had
41 US Unwilling to Remove Textile Quotas, CHINA DAILY, April 4, 2004, availableat

http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-04/04/content_32044l .htm (last visited March 26,
2005)
42 Id.

43 Id.

4Id.
45Jane Li, MFA Phase Out- Impact on Chinese Workers, 52 ASIAN LABOUR UPDATE, (July -Sept.
2004) at http://www.amrc.org.hk/5203.htm (last visited March 26, 2006).
46 Id.

47 id.
48 Id.

49Id.
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feared?
Certainly the predictions were dire, and not merely amongst
traditionally alarmist organizations. The World Trade Organization (WTO), for
example, made a series of well-publicized predictions that China would gain
significantly after January 1, 2005, at the expense of most other countries.5 ° It
anticipated that, in the absence any new protectionist measures or currency
movement, China's share of E.U. apparel imports would rise from 18% to
29%.51 The WTO projected an even more dramatic increase in China's share of
U.S. apparel imports from 16% to 50%.52 The smaller increase in China's share
of the E.U. market reflects the fact that the U.S. waited until January 1, 2005, to
eliminate many of its key quotas, while the EU had done so somewhat earlier.53
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has estimated that China could in fact
gain an even greater share of the global market than that suggested by the
WTO.54 The IMF has suggested that, given China's attractiveness to foreign
buyers, China's apparel exports could double by January, 2008. 55
The early months of 2005 offered few hopes for many developing
nations, as the worst-case scenario predictions of the IMF and the WTO
appeared to be coming to pass. Indeed, the initial surge of Chinese exports to
the U.S. and EU has been described as "explosive" by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).56 Between April 2004 and April 2005, for
example, the volume of U.S. imports from China of cotton nightwear (quota
code 351) increased 660%; of manmade fiber nightwear (651) by 248%; of
cotton slacks (348) by 1,584%; of cotton knit blouses (339) by 1,639%; of
cotton trousers (347) by 1,420%; of manmade fiber knit blouses (639) by 324%;
and manmade fiber skirts (642) by 257%. As the USAID concluded in June
2005: "China, with its vast supply of labor, significant upstream capacity in
textiles and manufacturing, efficient garment factories, and well-developed
logistics infrastructure, has achieved breathtaking gains in exports in just the
first few months of quota-free trade." 57

50 Kalish, supranote 20, at 3.
51 Id.
52 id.
53 Id.
54 id.

55 Kalish, supranote 20, at 4.

Lynn Salinger et al., Report prepared for United States Agency for International Development,
MeasuringCompetitiveness and Labor Productivity in Cambodia's Garment Industry (June 2005),
availableat
http://www.usaid.gov/kh/democracy-and-governance/documents/703CambodiaGarmentSector_
MainReport-Nathan.pdf (last visited March 26, 2006)(hereinafter USAID Report).
17 Id. at v.
56
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The tidal wave of Chinese imports, however, was of such a scale that it
created a serious political backlash in both Europe and the U.S. The terms of
China's 2001 accession to the WTO allow WTO members to restrain marketdisrupting imports for 12 years after China's accession. The so-called textiles
safeguard clause in the accession agreement, covering all products in the WTO
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, permits 90-day safeguard measures on a
revolving basis, but is available only until December 31, 2008.58 Following the
extraordinary increase in China's apparel exports after January 1, 2005,
governments in the U.S. and the EU were inundated with safeguard petitions
from domestic manufacturers demanding the reinstatement of protectionist
barriers to ward off the potentially crippling flow of cheap Chinese products.5 9
The U.S. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA),
reviewed safeguard petitions in a number of product categories, and in May
2005 announced its intention to impose new quotas in several categories.6 ° In
late April 2005, the European
Union also decided to investigate imports of nine
61
product lines from China.
The uncertainty as to whether importing countries may act to limit
apparel and textile imports - in particular whether the U.S. and E.U. will
attempt to limit the tide of imports from China - has created uncertainty and has
undoubtedly impacted decisions made by importers. Fearing the potential that
their orders from China may be trapped on boats or otherwise made unavailable
as a result of government protectionism, buyers have shown a reluctance to
entirely switch their production to China.62 As Deloitte Research has predicted:
"Apparel and textile producers will seek to diversify risk. As such, they will
not put all their eggs in the China basket." 63 In June 2005, USAID similarly
concluded that U.S. and EU buyers were "retaining multiple sources of supply
while waiting to see how safeguard actions (new quotas) against China

" Id. at 7 fi6.
'9

Id. at 7-8.

60 Id. at 7. The committee confirmed market disruption for the following categories: cotton knit

shirts and blouses (quota code 338/339); cotton trousers (347/348); cotton and manmade fiber
underwear (352/652); men's and boy's woven cotton and manmade fiber shirts (340/640); manmade
fiber trousers (647/648); manmade fiber knit shirts and blouses (638/639); and combed cotton yam
(301). Id. at 7; See also CITA news releases available at www.otexa.ita.doc.gov (last visited March
26, 2006).
61 Id. at 7-8. T-shirts, pullovers, blouses, stockings and socks, men's trousers, women's overcoats,
brassieres, flax or ramie yam, and woven-fabric yarn. Id. at 8. See also http://tradeinfo.cec.eu.int/textiles/index.cfm (last visited March 26, 2006).
62 Kalish, supra note 20, at 4.
63 Id. at 1.
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undertaken by the United States and European Union in early 2005 will play
out." 64

The lingering possibility of future restrictions being imposed by
importing countries probably explains why the dire predictions of the WTO and
IMF have not yet come to pass. Ira Kalish, the Global Director of Consumer
Business at Deloitte Research, has noted that the trade is "freer trade but not
completely free trade. How free depends on decisions yet to be made by
importing country governments., 65 This is an important observation. The
elimination of quotas did not eliminate all potential barriers to the free global
trade in garments and textiles. Tariffs and import duties are, with certain
restrictions, still permitted. A number of countries, including the U.S., maintain
duty reduction programs to favor one region over another.66 In addition,
restrictive rules of origin, the rules that govern how a product is labeled and
whether it can be imported, still operate. 67 Thus, the garment and textile
industry continues to face a number of regulatory schemes that may continue to
distort trade and investment patterns.68 In addition, governments in importing
countries face strong domestic pressure to counter the perceived "tidal wave" of
cheap Chinese imports. As Ira Kalish noted:
Apparel producers and distributors would like to be able to
plan on the basis of precise knowledge of the future trading
regime.
Yet that has not been possible.
Importing
governments may or may not act to limit apparel and textile
imports depending on the future flow of goods, the political
consequences, and the political power of competing interests.
Consequently, risk exists and market participants must plan
accordingly.69

64 USAID Report, supra note 56, at v.
65

Kalish, supranote 20, at 1.

66 Lamar, supra note 9, at 609.
67

For example, in order to qualify for duty-free importation of textiles and garments into Europe,

manufacturers must meet strict rules of origin- demonstrating that the garments and certain of their
constituent parts (such as yam), have originated in Lome or Generalized System of Preferencesqualifying countries. For many producers, such as those in Africa, which rely heavily on imported
constituent parts, it is frequently impossible to meet such requirements. Lamar, supra note 9, at
609.
6 id.
69 Kalish, supranote 20, at 1.
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COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE PHASE-OUT THE
QUOTA SYSTEM:
The ending of quotas has predictably impacted some countries far
more seriously than others. Several nations have experienced a rapid loss of a
significant portion of their manufacturing capacity, while others have - at least
in the short term - benefited at the expense of their less competitive neighbors.
Even in those countries that have witnessed an increase in textiles exports since
January 2005, however, this increase is partly explained by the continuation of
certain artificial restraints placed upon Chinese textile imports by the E.U., and
by current uncertainty amongst Western buyers as to whether Washington will
bow to political pressure and reassert trade restrictions on Chinese textiles. 70 If
these artificial restraints on Chinese textile exports are resolved, the worst-case
scenarios of a massive manufacturing shift from developing nations to China
may materialize.
The consequences of shifts in global production of the garment
industry are likely to impact all those developing countries currently active in
the production of garments. Ellen Israel Rosen, for example, has predicted that
amongst the "[h]uge losers in this race to the bottom" will be countries such as
Costa Rica, Haiti, Jamaica, South Africa, Mauritius, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar and Mexico. 71 This paper will briefly outline the
anticipated impact on just eight nations: five generally expected to suffer as a
result of the new trade liberalization: Fiji, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Macao,
and Mongolia; one country, Cambodia, which, in a closely-watched gambit, is
attempting to maintain its attractiveness to Western buyers by eschewing the
inevitability of the "race to the bottom" and emphasizing instead its
comparatively progressive labor standards; India, the country which is
aggressively - but perhaps belatedly - attempting to position itself to reap
significant rewards from the end of quotas; and, finally, China, the country
universally acknowledged as the huge winner in the newly liberalized trade
regime.72

70USAID Report, supra note 56, at v.
71 See Rosen The Wal-Mart Effect: The World Trade Organizationand the Race to the Bottom,
supra note 5, at 265.
72For a discussion of the garment industry in Mauritius, South Africa, Lesotho, Kenya, Zimbabwe,
Swaziland, Madagascar, Botswana and Tanzania, see Lamar, supranote 9; U.S. INT'L TRADE
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Fiji:
Fiji is an example of how changes in the world trade in garments can
impact even the smallest economy. The Fijian garment industry has had a short
history, but is now a critical part of the economic structure of the country.
Indeed, the garment industry surpassed sugar as the number one export sector in
1997.73 Fiji's two largest industries, garments and sugar, are both currently in
what has been described as "terminal crisis. ' 74 Epeli Ganilau, the former head
of the Great Council of Chiefs, has estimated that Fiji stands to lose US$120
million of its national revenue, with upwards of 5,000 jobs expected to be lost
in the garment industry. 75 These predictions appear well-founded, with the
April 2005 closure of the Ghim Li Apparel factory, Fiji's largest manufacturer.

COMMISSION, PUB. No. 3056, Likely Impact OfProviding Quota-FreeAnd Duty-FreeEntry To
Textiles And Apparel From Sub-SaharanAfrica, 2-13 (1997); Dorte Verner, Are Wages and
productivity in Zimbabwe affected by human capitalinvestment and internationaltrade? World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2101, Washington: World Bank (1999). For Egypt, see Salah
EI-Amrousi, Qiz Mythology, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2005/743/ec4.htm (last visited March 26, 2006). In anticipation of
the end of quotas, apparel quotas from El Salvador declined by 30 percent in November 2004, and it
is expected that the apparel sector of the Dominican Republic will lose up to 40 percent of its jobs
as a result of the end of quotas, see Basu, supra note 3; BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, WAGES, BENEFITS, POVERTY LINE, AND MEETING WORKERS

NEEDS INTHE APPAREL AND FOOTWARE INDUSTRIES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES (2000), available at
www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/oiea/wagestudy (last visited March 26, 2006); U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMMISSION, TEXTILES AND APPAREL: ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF CERTAIN

FOREIGN SUPPLIERS TO THE U.S. MARKET, Pub. No. 3056, Inv. 332-379(2004), available at
http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/pub3671/main.html (last visited March 26, 2006); Sweatingfor Fashion:
Labour Comes Cheap, and Will Get CheaperStill, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2004, available at
www.economist.com; Richard P. Applebaum, Institute for Social, Behavioral, and Economic
Research, Assessing the Impact of the PhasingOut of the Agreement on Textile and Clothingand
Apparel Exports on the Least Developed andDeveloping Countries (2004). Turkey, Morocco, and
Central Europe jointly accounted for over one quarter of the E.U.'s apparel imports in 2002. As Ira
Kalish has concluded: "It is expected that the end of quotas will create turmoil for each of these
countries." Kalish, supra note 20, at 2; for Mexico, See Rosen The Wal-Mart Effect: The World
Trade Organizationand the Race to the Bottom,, supranote 5, at 265.; NATIONAL LABOR
COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 6. For a discussion of the insecurity of the Mexican maquiladora
industry, see Elisabeth Malkin, ManufacturingJobs Are Exiting Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002,
atWI.
73 DONOVAN STOREY, OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, The Fiji Garment Industry, 4 (Aug. 2004), at
http://www.oxfam.org.nz/resources/oxfam%20Fiji%2OGarment%2OStudy.pdf. (last visited March
26, 2006)
14 Frank Gaglioti, Textile Factor Closure devastatesFiian Economy, World Socialist Web Site
(May 19, 2005) at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/may2005/fiji-ml9.shtml. (last visited March
26, 2006)
75Id.
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Singaporean firm Ghim Li was set up in Fiji to exploit the U.S. quota system,
and manufactured apparel for Sears Roebuck, Wal-Mart and Kmart. With the
end of the garment quotas in January 2005, however, the decision was made by
Ghim Li to relocate production to China.76
The Fijian garment industry grew rapidly following the 1987 coup by
General Sitiveni Rabuka.77 In an attempt to attract foreign investors, the
government suppressed trade unions 78 , set a minimum wage below the poverty
level, and offered a 13-year tax "holiday" for garment firms which exported at
least 70 percent of their product. 79 Australian apparel firms invested heavily in
Fiji following 1991 when the Australian Labor Government created the Import
Credit Scheme, which provided subsidies to Australian exporters of textiles,
clothing and footwear.80 The result was that Australian manufacturers began
the apparel manufacturing process in Australia, before exporting the
components to Fiji for assembly. The finished garments were then re-exported
to Australia to take advantage of the South Pacific Area Regional Trade and
Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), which provided Fiji with
tariff-free exports to Australia. 81 At its peak in 2000, the garment industry was
82
responsible for 31 percent of Fiji's total exports and 11 percent of its GDP. 83
Profit margins for the overseas firms were estimated to be around 30 percent.
However the industry went into decline following a May 2000 coup and
subsequent political instability and Australian trade sanctions.84 Foreign
manufacturers began pulling out of Fiji at that time, with 14 factories closing in
the months after the coup. 85 The decision by Australia to drop its sanctions in
December 2000 did not encourage the foreign firms to return. 86 With the end of
quotas on the horizon, Fiji was simply no longer considered a necessary part of
international manufacturing nor a worthwhile risk, and any advantage it had
once offered for its access to quota-restricted markets was soon to disappear in
January 2005.87

Id.
Id.
78 Gagioti, supra note 74.
76

77

'9 Id. See also STOREY, supra note 73, at 9.

Gagioti, supra note 74.
81 Id.
80

82

id.

83

Id.
Gaglioti, supra note 74.

84

85 Id.
86
87

Id.
Id.
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Oxfam research indicates that Fijian garment workers earn as little as
$1.08 an hour, with some garment factory wages declining since 2000.88 For a
majority of the workers, the wages, however meager, are critical for meeting
basic needs, and are the central component of family income. A high
proportion of garment workers live in peri-urban squatter settlements in order to
avoid the costs of formal housing, and to minimize travel to the factory.89
Nevertheless, the collapse of the garment industry remove the only source of
income for thousands of Fijian families, and is likely to exacerbate the problems
of poverty, unemployment, social inequality, and prostitution. The Fijian
Garment Industry report concluded that: "[A]ny collapse [of the garment
industry] would create a crisis which would be both human and economic.
Though low even by local standards, garment wages are a critical factor in
supporting the urban poor." 90 Fiji Textile Clothing and Footwear president,
Ramesh Solanki, has warned that job losses in the garment industry will have
serious social implications because the industry provides employment for
females from poor education backgrounds who will struggle to find alternative
work. 9'
Bangladesh:
Between 1984 and 2002, the apparel industry in Bangladesh saw an
increase in the number of manufacturing facilities from 180 to over 3,600
facilities, 90 percent of which are located in and around Dhaka, and the port of
Chittagong.92 The value of Bangladesh apparel exports rose from US$131
million in 1985-1986, to US$4,583 million in 2001-2002. 93 The United Nations
Development Programme concluded that Bangladesh's "economy has improved
significantly during the last decade, driven primarily by the garment sector,
which brought in US$6 billion in export earnings in 2001-2002." 94 The apparel

88 Storey, supra note 73, at 31. Oxfam International is a confederation of non-governmental
organizations working together to fight global poverty and injustice by focusing on development,
advocacy and relief. See www.oxfan.org.
89 Storey, supra note 73 at 32-33.
90 Gaglioti, supra note 74.
9' Pacific Islands Development Program, Trade Pact Called Threatto Fiji GarmentIndustry, FijI
TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 7, 2006, at http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/February/02-07-13.htm
(last visited March 26, 2006).
92 Mlachila and Yang, supra note 33 at 7.
93 id.
94 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, LOOMING TRADE CuRBs PuT BANGLADESH

JOBS AT RISK, (June 2003) at http://www.un-bd.org/undp/feature/2003/0203/0603/index.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2006).
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export sector was initially jump-started by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
from foreign investors primarily from the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong
SAR, who were taking advantage of Bangladesh's export quotas to restricted
markets, and who established factories in the export promotion zone (EPZ). 95
However, subsequent government restrictions intended to reserve the most
valuable quotas for Bangladeshi manufacturers, have resulted in a decline in the
role of FDI in the Bangladesh apparel industry.96
By 2004, the apparel industry in Bangladesh employed approximately
1.8 million people, which represented some 40 percent of all manufacturing
employment. 97 90 percent of those employed in the garment industry were
women, and it is estimated that the industry supports about 10-15 million people
indirectly.98 Though the apparel industry contributes only 5 percent to
Bangladesh's GDP, it has a vital role in providing employment to a large
segment of that nation's poorest and most vulnerable families. 99 The United
Nations estimates that upward of one million garment workers in Bangladesh
will lose their jobs as a direct result of the elimination of the MFA quotas.100
There was widespread concern in Bangladesh that the end of quotas
would hit the Bangladesh economy hard. The Bangladesh economy relies
heavily on the exports of garments and textiles. In 2002, for example, these
exports accounted for over 77 percent of Bangladesh's total manufacturing
exports.' 0' Only one exporter (Macau SAR) had a higher percentage of textiles
and garments as a percentage of total manufacturing exports. In addition, 94
percent of Bangladesh's textile and garment exports in 2002 were to quotarestrained markets, again amongst the highest in the world. 10 2 With such an
overwhelming reliance upon exports to the U.S. and the E.U., in particular,
Bangladesh was particularly vulnerable to American buyers switching to
cheaper produces following the ending of quotas. As the authors of an IMF
Working Paper noted in June 2004: "Bangladesh... is potentially vulnerable to
the large shock of the final stage of the quotas phase-out ...Bangladeshi
exporters will likely find it difficult to compete in the short to medium term.' 0 3
They noted that while Bangladesh's wages are low compared with most of its
95 Mlachila and Yang, supra note 33 at 7-8.

96Idat 8.The UNDP provides slightly different figures: two million people, eighty percent of whom
are women. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 94.
9'Mlachila and Yang, supra note 33 at 6.
9' Id.at
6-7.
99 Id.at 6.
'0o UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 94.
''Mlachila and Yang, supra note 33 at 4.
102 id.
103 Id.
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competitors, it is hampered by low productivity, inadequate infrastructure
requiring public or private sector investment, and fragmented governmental
policies.' °4 Despite the fact that Bangladesh labor costs are lower than China's,
the associated transportation, logistical and materials
result in Bangladesh being
05
a more expensive place to manufacture garments.'
Bangladesh's position is further complicated by its lack of an adequate
textile industry to supply cloth to the apparel factories. Bangladesh has a small
textile industry, which is unable to fully meet the demand of the garment
industry. In 2002, for example, Bangladesh imported US 1.8 billion of textiles
and related items.' 0 6 In addition, Bangladesh's textile industry itself relies
heavily on imported cotton and other raw materials. 10 7 This reliance on
imported textiles and imported raw materials for the domestic textile industry,
makes Bangladesh particularly vulnerable to the uncertainty of the world
market. As Chinese apparel manufacturing increasingly outstrips the available
Chinese domestic textile supply, Chinese apparel producers are themselves
increasingly turning to the international market, increasing competition for the
available textile products and driving up prices
that Bangladesh garment
08
manufacturers have to pay for imported materials.1
The Philippines:
The garment industry in the Philippines reached its peak under the
MFA in 1991, when it represented as much as 35% of that nation's total exports
and accounted for an estimated total workforce of one million employees. 0 9
Starting in the mid-1990's, however, the local garment industry witnessed a
steady decline as it faced increasing competition from developing nations such
as Cambodia. Under the MFA, roughly 92% of the Philippine's garment and
textile exports were to the quota-regulated markets of the U.S. and the E.U."
While the Philippine exporters were largely shielded from the most dramatic
impact of direct international competition with other producing nations, it
became clear in the course of the 1990's that the local industry was unable to
104 id.

105George Wehrfritz and Alexandra A. Seno, Succeeding at Sewing, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 2005, at
38. ("[L]abor for a shirt made in Bangladesh runs just $1.52, compared with $2.28 in China, but
after factoring in materials and transportation, the total cost of the Chinese shirt is $11.15 - almost a
dollar cheaper [than that produced in Bangladesh]").
106Mlachila and Yang, supra note 33 at 7.
107 Id.
108 id.
'09 Duvillier, supra note 29 at 1.

"o Id.at 3.
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compete with leading Asian exporters when forced to do so. While new
producers, such as Cambodia, began gaining access to the U.S. and E.U.
markets, and thereby offering a production alternative to foreign buyers, the
Philippines saw its slice of the export pie gradually shrink. Between 1994 and
2004, its share of the U.S. clothing market shrunk from 4.3% to 2.8%.111
Though this decline of market share was somewhat off-set by a growth in U.S.
demand, nevertheless it was evident that it was not the Philippines that was
benefiting from any market expansion. In the course of the same decade (19942004), the number of formal textile and garment workers in the Philippines
declined from around 900,000 to approximately 311,000.112 In 2003, for
example, an estimated 90 textile or apparel factories closed or retrenched,
eliminating 9,443 workers.13
Countries like the Philippines, which struggled with an aging
manufacturing capacity and infrastructure, inefficient economic incentives from
corrupt political agencies, and high-profile industrial conflict in many of its
unionized factories, saw a dramatic but predictable loss of orders immediately
prior to and following January 2005.114 There had been a general decline of the
Philippines' textile manufacturing base since the mid-1990's, as foreign buyers
began shifting their orders to more cost-effective nations elsewhere in Asia, but
the end of quotas nevertheless had a noticeable impact 15 As of March 2005,
the value of apparel and clothing exports from the Philippines decreased by
16.6% (US$149.23 million) compared to the same period in 2004 (US$179.01
1
million). 16
In 2000 and 2001, in what many believed was an indicator of things to
come, the Philippine manufacturing industry was hit by a US$198 million
export loss when existing global quotas on several items (notably baby clothing
and luggage products) were phased out.1 1 7 The rapidity with which production
shifted following the phase-out of quotas on those items, confirmed for many a
growing fear that a similar shift from the Philippines would occur following the
elimination of the remaining textile and garment quotas by January 2005. Some

. Id. at 2 citing United States International Trade Commission (USITC) US Imports of Clothing
from Top 30 Exporters (1990-2004), available at http://datawebusitc.gov.
112 Duvillier, supra note 29 at 3-4.
113 Duvillier, supra note 29 at 4 citing Key Labor Statistics, Bureau of Labor and Employment
Statistics (DOLE), April 2005 available at http://www.manila-online.net/bles/.
"'4 Duvillier, supra note 29
at 1-2.
"5 Duvillier, supra note 29 at 1-2 citing Press Release, Philippines National Statistics Office,
Merchandise Export Performance March 2005 (May 10, 2005) available at http://www.census
.gov/ph/data/pressrelease/2005/ex0503tx.html.
116 Id.
"'

Id.at 2.
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observers warned that half of all jobs in the textile and garment industry
in the
1 18
Philippines would be in jeopardy with the end of the quota system.
While the Philippine garment industry has undoubtedly been hurt by
the rise of Chinese manufacturing, some in the Philippines see China as a
possible savior of Philippine manufacturing. With the traditional economic
relationship between U.S. buyers and Philippine manufacturers in jeopardy, the
Philippine government is looking to China to become a key future trading
partner. In November 2005, the visiting member of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China, Zhang Dejiang, was asked by Speaker Jose de
Venecia to help rebuild the Philippine garment and textile industry.' 19 In
particular, de Venecia noted, the Philippines "required fresh working capital,
new technology, and joint ventures, [particularly] 2 with Guangdong
industrialists."' ' 20 The initial Chinese response was positive.' '
Macao:
Located in Eastern Asia, bordering the South China Sea and mainland
China, the two islands that make up Macao have an estimated population of less
than half a million people. Since its reversion to China as a special
administrative region in 1999, Macao's economy has remained one of the most
open in the world. 22 Macao's garment industry began following World War
Two, and flourished in the 1960's, when Hong Kong manufacturers moved
facilities there to avoid quotas imposed by the UK on Hong Kong garment
exports. 123 Macao further prospered under the MFA-regime during the 1970's
and 1980's, as it continued to be an attractive manufacturing base for Hong

Is

Emilio R. Gonzales, Behind The Seams, 11 PHILipPINE BusINESS MAGAZINE 8 (November

2004) at http://www.philippinebusiness.com.ph/archives/magazine/vol 1-2004/11-8/forecast.htm.
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
119Philippines:Chinese Aid Sought for Textile, Garments Industry, Fibre2Fashion Web Site, (Nov.
12,2005), at http://www.fibre2fashion.com/news/apparel-newsdetails.aspx?news-id=8517 (last
visited April 1, 2006).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 CIA, THE WORLD FACT BOOK-MACAO, at

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mc.html (last visited April 1, 2006) (Colonized
by the Portuguese in the 16"' century, Macao was the first European settlement in the Far East.
Pursuant to an agreement signed by China and Portugal on 13 April 1987, Macao became the
Macau Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China on 20 Dec. 1999. China has promised that,
under its "one country, two systems" formula, China's socialist economic system will not be
practiced in Macao, and that Macao will enjoy a high degree of autonomy in all matters except
foreign and defense affairs for the next 50 years.)
123 MACAO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STUDY CENTER, supra note 3 1.
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Kong producers.1 2 4 By the 1980's, the textile and garment industry accounted
for more than 70 percent of all Macao's exports, with over 80 percent going to
the U.S. and EU. 12 Though Macao's economy is heavily dependent on gaming
and tourism, the number of workers in the garment industry now surpasses
those working in hotels and restaurants. 126 Macao's garment industry is
characterized by "small and medium-sized enterprises, with scattered
distribution and relatively [out-dated] production technology." 127 The average
manufacturing factory in Macao has just 33 employees, with 70 percent of the
1,232 factories employing between 1-19 employees, and only 42 factories
having more than 200 employees. 128 Since the early 1990's, higher labor costs
in Macao, combined with the increasing attractiveness of doing business in
mainland China, have resulted in a significant shift of Hong Kong-financed
garment manufacturing from Macao to China, particularly to the area around
Zhuhai and Zhongshan in Guangdong Province. 129 According to the Macao
SAR Government, between 1995 and 1999 the number of textile factories
130
declined by 30 percent, and the number of garment factories by 7 percent.
Between 1990 and 1999, the number of garment factories declined from 745 to
394, or 47 percent, with employees falling from 35,917 to 26, 429, or 27
percent.1 3 ' With the end of the MFA-regime, the shift to China is expected to
become even more dramatic. The small size of the Macao factories, the low
technological level, low added value and labor-intensive production, the heavy
reliance on outside Hong Kong investors, and the role of Macao as almost
entirely a manufacturing platform geared for exports to quota-restricted
markets, makes Macao particularly vulnerable to trade liberalization and the end
of the MFA regime. In response to a questionnaire from the Macao
Development Strategy Study Centre, only 53 of the 99 enterprises in the textile
industry employing more than 100 people indicated that they planned to stay in

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Figures from Macao's Statistics and Census Service show that around 10 percent of Macao's

labor force was employed in garment factories in 2005, or 24,673 out of a total workforce of
240,000. In contrast, 21,368 workers were employed in hotels and restaurants. GarmentIndustry
Employs 10 Pct. Of Macao 's
Labor Force, PEOPLES DAILY ONLINE, June 20, 2005 at
http://english.people.com.cn/200506/20/eng20050620 191250.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
127 MACAO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STUDY CENTER,

supra note 31. See Macao Data,

http://www.macaudata.com/macau/draw/e05.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
128 MACAO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STUDY CENTER,
129
130
131

supra note 31.

Id.
Id,
Id,
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Macao. 132 It is anticipated that the total value of textile and garment exports
from Macao will decline by 40-50 percent as a result of the end of quotas.133 It
is hoped that some manufacturers who shift manufacturing to China will
continue to keep offices in Macao, in order to avoid the currency controls in the
mainland and to conduct foreign-currency payment and market operations.
Smaller-scale manufacturing
enterprises in Macao are, with few exceptions, not
134
expected to survive.
Mongolia:
Mongolia, a land-locked country bordering China, is an example of a
country with no history of garment production, which became the focus of
Chinese garment manufacturers purely to provide access to quota-restricted
markets. By 2000, over 30,000 people were employed in primarily foreignowned factories making clothes for export to the U.S. 135 By late 2004, as
foreign manufacturers began shifting production to China, the number had
declined to around 20,000.136 These workers were the breadwinners for an
estimated 80-100,000 people.' 37 By 2004, the garment and textile industry
represented 29.2 percent of the country's exports. 138 In 2003, the total value of
sewn and knitted articles had risen to US$97 million, or over 37 million
items. 139 97 percent of all sewn articles and 98 percent of knitted articles were
exported to the U.S. 140 By late 2004, however, it was clear that the
predominantly Chinese companies that had set up production in Mongolia, were
132 MACAO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STUDY CENTER, supra note 31.
133 id.

134Id. See WTC Macau Holds Seminar On The New Regime of Textile and Clothing Exports to the
EUBeyond 2005, WORLD TRADE CENTER MACAU NEWSLETTER, Issue No. 26 (Oct. 2003) at
http://www.wtc-macau.com/news/n26/n26-index.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006); Managingthe
Transitionto a Responsible Post-MFA Global Garment Industry, Research Briefing for the BSR
Conference 2004 (Nov. 2004) at
http://www.bsr/org/BSRConferences/2004/session notes/2004-post-mfa-garment-industry.pdf
(last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
"' John Smith, Mongolian Garment Industry: Likely Effects ofAbolitioh of Quotas and Actions
That Are Urgently Required,MONGOLIAN ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM AND COMPETITIVENESS

PROJECT (2004) at introduction, International Trade at
http://www.eprcchemonics.biz/documents/techreports/nov l52004_abolition_quotas-en.pdf
(last visited April 1, 2006).
136

Id.

137 id.
138 id.

139 id.at § I.

140Smith, supra note 135, at Executive Summary.
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highly unlikely to remain once the MFA quota-regime was lifted. 41 Indeed,
many of the factories had been planned to operate only until January 2005.142
Mongolia faces many significant problems in attempting to retain a competitive
garment industry, not least of which is that it is landlocked, and relies upon
China and Russia for access to raw materials and markets. 43 Internally,
logistical networks are poor, the workforce unskilled, managerial expertise
lacking, and governmental bureaucracy burdensome. 44 The Mongolian
Government was aggressive in providing encouragement to foreign businesses,
but failed to adequately support domestic manufacturers, resulting in an
industry dominated by foreign investors with no real or long-term ties to
Mongolia. 145 Moreover, Mongolian factories produce few items with a high
46
unit value, relying instead on basic commodity items with less value added.'
These basic items are particularly vulnerable to cheap competition from
China.' 47 A report published by the Mongolian Economic Policy Reform and
Competitiveness Project, concluded that "The Mongolian Government alone
will not be able to prevent wholesale closure of the Industry, but it can set the
climate to encourage industry not only to stay but also to develop for the
future." 148 The future, however, looks desperate for the Mongolian garment
industry, as its factories are closed and the manufacturing machines physically
removed-by their owners to facilities in neighboring China.
Cambodia:
As in many developing nations, Cambodia's garment and textile
industry flourished under the MFA as primarily Chinese investors saw an
opportunity to access the U.S. and EU markets free from the need to obtain the
more limited quotas available in their home countries. Throughout the 1990's,
foreign investment flowed into Cambodia, factories were constructed in and
around Phnom Penh, and tens of thousands of young women poured from the
countryside into the city to work in textile industry. 14 9 By early 2005, the

141

Id.

Id. at Executive Summary.
§2.
144 id.
142

143 Id. at
145

Smith, supra note 135 at §2.

146 Id. at

§1.
Id.
148 Id. at Executive Summary.
147

149 John Hall, Human Rights and the Garment Industry in Contemporary Cambodia, 36 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 119, 128 (Winter 2000).
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membership of the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia (GMAC)
included 238 companies. 50 Only five percent of garment factories are owned
by Cambodians.' 51 The rows of factories are clustered around Phnom Penh,
from which trucks transport filled shipping containers to the port city of
Sihanoukville located 230 kilometers away. The value of garment exports grew
from US$26 million in 1995, to US$2 billion in 2004.152 Garment exports
constitute nearly 80 percent of Cambodia's merchandise exports.' 53 The U.S.
and the EU represent 64 percent and 29 percent respectively, of Cambodia's
total garment exports in 2004.14
The USAID reports that clothing
manufactured
for
the
Gap
represent
one-third
of all Cambodian garment
55
exports.1
The sudden dependence of Cambodia on a single industry controlled
by foreigners has created particular vulnerability. The influx of garment
factories occurred in what had been up until that time a largely preindustrialized rural society suffering the lingering effects of decades of war,
genocidal oppression, and societal turmoil. For the government of Hun Sen, the
foreign factory owners have reportedly provided a steady source of foreign
currency in the form of taxes, duties, pay-offs and bribes that has helped secure
his authoritarian control over the country.' 56 For the people of Cambodia, the
value of the factory jobs is even more essential. By October 2004, an estimated
230,000 Cambodians worked in garment factories, of whom 85-90 percent were
women.' 57 With rising poverty levels in the Cambodian countryside associated
with failed government policies, illegal logging, crop failure and lowered prices
resulting from cheap imported foodstuffs, the salaries of the factory workers
have become a vital component of the floundering rural economy."' USAID
150USAID Report, supra note 56, at 3.
151 id.
152 Id.
153 See USAID Report, supra note 56, at 3; International Monetary Fund (IMF), Cambodia;
Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 04.330, Washington DC (2004), available at
http:///www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/crO4330.pdf (last visited April 1, 2006).
154USAID Report, supra note 56, at 4.

155 Id.

156Factory owners have reportedly funded organizations friendly to Hun Sen's ruling CPP party,
while pro-CPP groups have attempted to suppress a free trade union movement and promote unions
with strong links to the government. See George McLeod, Union riot tragedyfor laborrights,
PHNOM PENH POST, Issue 12/13 (June 20-July 3, 2003) availableat
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/TXT/comments/c 1213-I.htm (last visited April 1, 2006).
157 Kingdom of Cambodia Ministry of Commerce, Cambodia'sGarment Industry: Meeting the
Challengesof the Post-QuotaEnvironment, Phase I Report for the Asian Development Bank, (Oct.
2004) at iv.
158See Eric Kenefick, Report On The Cambodian 1998 JointUNICEF-WFPBaselineSurvey Of
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estimates that the remittances sent home by the young female factory workers
now sustains 20 percent of the entire country's population of 13 million
people.159 As USAID concluded: "These workers' incomes are critical to their
families, the country, and even the region."' 160 The stakes for Cambodia's
continued success in the global economy are, therefore, extraordinarily high.
Interestingly, since 1999 Cambodia has attempted to create a niche as a
socially responsible manufacturing platform. There are some hopes that this
niche may continue to make Cambodia attractive to buyers even if Cambodia
lacks the ability to be competitive in terms of cost-efficiency with China. 161 By
the late 1990's, labor rights activists and researchers in the U.S. came to focus
on the labor abuses and poor working conditions evident in many of the new
garment factories in Cambodia. 162 Trade representatives for the Clinton
administration, headed by Ambassador C. Donald Johnson, saw an opportunity
to pressure the Cambodian manufacturers and government to abide by
international norms and local labor laws. 16 3 On January 20, 1999, the U.S. and
Cambodian governments signed the U.S./Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade
Agreement ("U.S./Cambodia Bilateral Agreement").' 64 This agreement was
remarkable for including a labor standards provision creating incentives for the
Cambodian garment industry to bring itself substantially into compliance with
international labor standards and Cambodian labor law. 1 65 This was the first
time that a labor standards provision had been included in a bilateral, U.S.negotiated trade agreement.

CASD ProjectAnd WFP Target Areas, 21-27 (Tulane University 1998) available at
http://www.wfp.org/operations/vam/country-experience/cambodia-vam/inex.asp (last visited April
1, 2006). Noah Davies, Acting Country Director of the U.N. World Food Program, has noted that
"the poverty is getting worse fight now and the situation of malnutrition of children is a crisis' with
over twenty percent suffering from "acute malnutrition ... The situation is much worse than people
recognize." MalnutritionReaching Crisis Level, WFP Says, CAMBODIA DAILY, Nov. 25, 1998, at
7.
"59USAID Report, supra note 56 at 1.
160 Id.

161 Id.at 3.

162See generally Hall, supra note 149.
163 Timothy A. Canova, InternationalLaw Confronts the Global Economy: Labor Rights, Human
Rights, and Democracy in Distress, 8 CHAPMAN L. R. 1, 14 (2005).
'64 Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-made Fiber, Non-Cotton Vegetable Fiber ad
Silk Blend Textiles and Textile Products Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Royal Government of Cambodia (1999).
'65 For the most authoritative analysis of the U.S./Cambodian Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement,
see Kolben, supra note 21; see also Andrew Wells-Dang, Linking Textiles to Labor Standards:
Prospectsfor Cambodia and Vietnam, Foreign Policy in Focus Policy Report, (June 2002) at
http://www.fpif.org/pdf/reports/PRtxt-labor.pdf (last visited April 1, 2006).
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Under the U.S./Cambodia Bilateral Agreement, which was renewed in
December 2001, the International Labor Organization (ILO) designed and
implemented a system of factory monitoring intended to ensure compliance
with applicable labor law and improving working conditions.' 66 Though flawed
in terms of scope, reluctance of the ILO to engage with unions, lack of
responsiveness to workers' complaints, and hampered by problems in
implementation, the U.S./Cambodia Bilateral Agreement has been described as
representing "an important and momentous experiment in transparent
monitoring."'167 With the accession of Cambodia into the WTO in 2005, and the
phasing out of the system of quotas permitted under the MFI, the ability of the
U.S. to directly link access to its market with ILO-monitored compliance with
local labor laws, has ended. Nevertheless, linking trade privileges to the respect
of labor rights was a creative experiment
which marked a significant move
68
forward for international labor standards.1
A June 2005 Phnom Penh workshop of garment industry, government,
and labor representatives, concluded that while the end of MFA quotas
undoubtedly threatened the future of the garment industry in Cambodia, the
situation was not as desperate as some had predicted one year previously. 169 It
was noted that Cambodia had - at least temporarily - been able to hold its own
in the first half of 2005. 170 By May 2005, for example, it was reported that
sixteen large garment factories had been scheduled to begin production by the
end of 2005, more than replacing the production capacity of the dozen factories
that have failed. 171
One explanation for Cambodia's apparent success in the post-quota
world, is its ability to offer to buyers a guarantee of compliance with basic labor
rights. 172 To certain western buyers, who have been stung by allegations of

167

Kolben, supra note 21, at 106-107.
Id. at 107.

168

WORLD BANK, CAMBODIA: SEIZING THE GLOBAL OPPORTUNITY-

166

INVESTMENT CLIMATE

ASSESSMENT AND REFORM STRATEGY FOR CAMBODIA, REPORT No. 27925-KH (2004).

169Associates for International Resources and Development (AIRD), Phnom Penh Workshop
Highlights Strategies to Increase LaborProductsin Cambodia (June 2005), at
http://www.aird.com/news.php?id=14 (last visited April 1, 2006).
170 AIRD, supra note 169. David Van, Textiles and ClothingCase Study - Cambodia, Asia Pacific
Regional Initiative on Trade, Economic Governance, and Human Development, United Nations
Development Program (2003).
17'Elizabeth Becker, Low Cost and Sweatshop-Free,N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2005 at C 1. But see Eric
Wasson, Cambodian Jean Exports to US DropAfter Quotas Lifted, THE CAMBODIA DAILY, March
23, 2005 at 14.
172 For a discussion of Cambodian labor law, see Hall, supra note 149, at 134-136 (freedom of
association, the right to organize, and collective bargaining, guaranteed by Articles 36, 41 and 42 of
the Cambodian Constitution; Articles 20(1) and 23(4) of the Universal Declaration of Human
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sweatshop abuses within their supply chain, this is a valuable guarantee. Brad
Figel, Director of Government Affairs at Nike, for example, has indicated that
73
Nike and other companies are willing to pay a premium for labor compliance.'
Nike. . .lost confidence in Cambodia's compliance in 2000 and began the
process of pulling out of the country. . .but re-entered Cambodia in 2002 after
the ILO began the labor monitoring
program and government and contractors
174
promised greater labor compliance.
The Cambodian government has decided to continue with the policy of
ILO factory monitoring. Undoubtedly, it concluded that for Cambodia to keep
its reputation for good labor standards, "it needs to continue letting the ILO
issue independent reports on factory working conditions. 175 Chain Prasith, the
Cambodian Minister of Commerce who reached the deal with Washington in
1999, has indicated that the benefits of the labor enforcement program have
exceeded expectations: "We are extending our labor standards beyond the end
of the quotas because we know that is why we continue to have buyers... If we
didn't respect the unions and labor standards, we would be killing the goose that
lays the golden eggs.' ' 176 Dan Henkle, a vice president for GAP, which is by far
the biggest buyer of Cambodian garments, has indicated that indeed the promise
177
of labor law compliance is key to GAP's decision to remain in Cambodia.
During an economic and trade meeting under World Bank auspices in Phnom

Rights; Article 8(1)(a) of the ICESCR; Chapter XI of the 1997 Labor Code; Article 7 of the ILO
Convention 87); 150-152 (dispute resolution, mediation and arbitration, protected by the 1997
Labor Code Ch. XII); 152-153 (pre-employment fees, covered by Article 7(1) of ILO Convention
181, and ILO Convention 29, ratified by Cambodia on 24 Feb. 1969; and Article 44 of the 1997
Labor Code); 154-158 (factory conditions, guaranteed by Article 7 of the ICESCR, Chapter VIII of
the 1997 Labor Code); 158-159 (equality of treatment, guaranteed by Article 2 of the Universal
Declaration of human Rights, Article 3 of the ICESCR, and Articles 45 and 46 of the Cambodian
Constitution); 159-162 (hours worked, guaranteed by Article 7(d) of the ICESCR, Article 1 of the
ILO Convention 29, Articles 137, 147, 161, 165 of the 1997 Labor Code); 162-166 (wage issues,
guaranteed by Article 23(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 7(a)(ii) of the
ICESCR, Articles 104, 107(2) and 117 of the 1997 Labor Code).
173 JENNIFER MAUL, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PROMOTING
CAMBODIA's COMPETITIVENESS IN A POST-MFA WORLD (Jul. 21, 2005) at

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfn?fa-eventDetail&id=810&&prog=z
visited April 1, 2006).

(last

174 MAUL, supra note 173; CAMBODIAN LABOR ORGANIZATION, WORKING CONDITION 2003
REPORT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF GARMENT, TEXTILES AND FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY (2004).

175 Daniel Ten Kate, New World Order; Can Cambodia's Garment Industry Survive? THE
CAMBODIA DAILY, Sept. 6, 2003 available at

http://wwwcamnet.com.kh/cambodia.daily/selected features/newworldorder.htm (last visited
April 1, 2006).
176 Becker, supra note 171.
177 ld.
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Penh in February 2005, he assured Cambodian officials that GAP would
remain, but only so long as Cambodia continued to follow its special labor
program. 178
The Cambodian Government's "respect" for trade unions is somewhat
less perfect than Mr. Cham's comments would suggest, and several leading
union officials not affiliated with Hun Sen's ruling CPP party have been
murdered in recent years. 179 Nevertheless, there appears to have been a genuine
improvement in factory conditions as a result of the program of ILO
monitoring. Ros Harvey, the ILO's Chief Technical Advisor in Cambodia, has
noted that while factory conditions in Cambodia are still not perfect, there has
been a tremendous amount of improvement.' 80 Nevertheless, labor standards
alone will not save the garment industry in Cambodia. USAID has concluded
that serious internal problems still hamper the Cambodian garment industry,
including a combination of significant governmental corruption, complex
business regulations, and difficult import-export procedures. 181 Harvey of the
ILO has warned that the country must strengthen its rule of law, reduce
corruption, and improve trade facilitation for the apparel industry to remain
competitive.' 82 It would appear that there has been some improvement in this
regard. With the apparel industry now accounting for ninety-percent of
Cambodia's export earnings, and with the factory owners able to shift
production to China or elsewhere with comparative ease, the factory owners are
reported to have begun wielding their considerable political power to encourage
the government to tackle the corruption which has been driving up production
costs.183
In response, the Government has begun to reduce levels of
bureaucratic rules which had required widespread "palm greasing" by business
owners. One estimate is that this has reduced production costs of each dozen tshirts from $2 to $1.10.184

178Becker, supra note 171. See also Gap, Inc., Social Responsibility Report (2003), at
http:www.gapinc.com/public/documents/CSRReport-03.pdf. (last visited April 1, 2006)
179Chea Vichea, president of a garment workers' union was shot to death in January 2004. Four
months later one of his top assistants was killed. Becker, supra note 171. See also George
McLeod, supranote 156 (discussing the violent suppression of a strike at Terratex when two
workers were killed on 13 June, 2003; the beating of pro-union demonstrators outside Trinunngal
Komsara factory in March 2003; and the activities of so-called "Brown Shirts" - gangs like the proCPP Pagoda Boys, hired by factory owners to assault and intimidate independent union officials.)
180 Maul, supra note 173.

'8' USAID Report, supra note 56.
182Maul, supra note 173.
183 Becker, supra note 171.

184 id.
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Most observers recognize that lowered production costs alone will not
secure Cambodia's future success. Sok Siphana, secretary of state at the
Ministry of Commerce and Cambodia's lead WTO negotiator, has summarized
the position Cambodia is adopting: "Companies will always go to China for
their profit. Yet profit alone is not always the basis for business. Imageconscious multinationals will continue using Cambodia because of our high
labor standards. 185 Cambodia is banking on the idea that Western buyers will
be willing to pay higher prices for garments produced in factories with better
labor standards. The President of the Garment Manufacturers' Association of
Cambodia, Van Sou leng, has complained that some western companies have
shown reluctance to follow their vocal support for Cambodia's position with
actual orders:
Instead of encouraging us with words, buyers should do it
with actions. In countries that don't care about child labor,
environmental protection or social justice, of course their
prices will be cheaper. We believe the trend186must change - if
not, it will be a sad story for some factories.
India:
Along with China, India is hoping to be a big winner as a result of the
end of the quota system. Some early estimates were that India's share of the
U.S. market would quadruple, from 4 percent to 15 percent, and that its share of
the EU garments sector would increase 50 percent, from 6 percent to 9
percent. 87 The WTO has estimated that India's share of the global trade in
textiles will increase from 3 percent in 2004 to 15 percent by 2010.188 There
were optimistic projections of a 50 percent increase in exports in just the first
quarter of 2005.189 Sears and Marks & Spencer have set up operations in India,

185 Kate, supra note 175.
186ld.

187PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry, End of Multi-Fibre Agreement to Make Indian
Textile and Garment Industry Grab 8% of World Market by 2010, (Oct. 16, 2004) at
http://www.phdccimail.com/pressrel.phd?sid=77 (last visited April 20, 2006)(Founded in 1905 as
the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the PHD Chamber of Commerce currently has a wide-ranging
membership of more than 1500 corporate entities and hundreds of trade organizations spread
throughout Northern Region India.)
188Geeta Pandey, India awaits Textiles Boom, BBC NEWS, December 22, 2004 available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/southasia/4105973.stm (last visited April 1, 2006).
189 Basu, supra note 3.
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and the Gap is expected to expand its sourcing from India. 190 Observers expect
Indian exports to jump from US$14 billion in 2004, to between US$40-80
billion by 2010.191 India's economy has been expanding at a rapid pace, driven
by its success as a manufacturer for the global market and protected from
currency contagion by capital and currency control. Total trade grew by more
than 20% over the last two years and at an annual rate of 25.6% during the first

ten months of the fiscal year ending April 2005.192 In comparison, U.S. trade
grew at less than half that rate. 193 By 2004, the textile industry in India
employed 35 million people and accounted for nearly one-quarter of India's
exports. 194
By the end of 2005, however, it was becoming clearer that, as the Wall
Street Journal noted, "the anticipated boom has been more of a muted bang" for
India. 195 The end of quotas was seen as a "once-in-a-lifetime" opportunity for
Indian manufacturing, but it appears that local companies have failed to fully
exploit the situation. 196 In the first quarter of 2005, for example, Indian exports
to the EU actually grew by just 5 percent to US$2 billion, rather than the 50
percent projected. 9 7 In contrast, Chinese198exports to the EU jumped 59 percent
to US$7.5 billion during the same period.
India's textile industry has several natural advantages. India is the
third largest producer of cotton in the world. 199 It has a cheap skilled workforce
and a huge domestic market. 200 Nevertheless, the MFA quota-regime is
believed by some to have fostered and protected production inefficiencies in
India. Rahul Mehta, managing director of Creative Outwear Ltd, one of India's
biggest garment producers, has noted that: "Quotas afforded the comfort of
assured business to manufacturers and to those who held a quota, and this
imparted a sense of stability. . . Even inefficient manufacturers got quotas,
which assured them business, and flab crept in.",20 ' In 2004, 75 percent of

190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Tyler

Marshall, The PriceofAsia's Growth, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, at Al.

" Id. at A18.
194 Pandey, supra note

188.

195Cris Prystay, India Plays Catch-Up in Textile;
Labor Rules Hinder Country From Benefiting
From End of Quotas, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at A15.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.

'99Shuba Madhukar, Indian Garments ina Brave New World, (December 29, 2004) available at
http://www.domain-b.com/industry/textiles/20041229-new-world.html (last visited April 1, 2006).
200 Id.
201 Id.
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India's apparel exports were to quota countries.20 2
Until recently, Indian law required that garment manufacturing should
be primarily a small-scale activity. 20 3 In 2004, over 80 percent of India's
apparel manufacturers operated with less than 20 machines.2 °4 The quotas were
distributed by the Indian Government on the basis of "past performance
entitlement" (PPE), which did not encourage manufacturers to expand facilities
or invest in modem equipment. 20 5 The result was that the Indian apparel
industry remained dominated by small-scale producers, with little to encourage
the efficiencies of scale, industrial consolidation, equipment modernization, and
infrastructure investment which has transformed the apparel industry in China.
In response to the anticipated ending of the MFA quota-system, the
Indian Government began reversing some of its earlier policies in order to
facilitate Indian competitiveness in the newly competitive global apparel trade.
For example, the machinery import duty has been reduced to a nominal 5
percent; excise duties have been significantly reduced; and a "textile
upgradation" fund has been established to encourage loans to support
manufacturing modernization.0 6 Most significantly, however, four years ago
the government removed garments from the list of industries reserved for smallscale manufacturers, ending a four decades-old government approach to the
garment industry as primarily a vehicle for providing stable employment for
India's poor.20 7 For decades, Indian garment companies were kept small by laws
passed shortly after Indian independence; large companies were required to
break up into small units, and while this encouraged geographically widespread
employment throughout the country, it destroyed economies of scale and
hampered India's international competitiveness.20 8 Though this was less a
problem under the quota regime, industry and government observers recognized
that it would be impossible to maintain such a system in a more competitive
post-quota global environment. Further, to encourage foreign investment in
India's garment industry and help generate the capital necessary for facility
modernization, the Indian Government has changed the law to permit textile
factories entirely owned and operated by foreigners with 100 percent Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI). 20 9 The shift from small-scale manufacturing to large-
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204 Madhukar, supra note 199.
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scale producers is far from complete, and most of India's garment
manufacturers still remain small by international standards. By December
2005, fewer than 10 manufacturers had yearly revenue above US$100 million,
and only one of US$200 million.210
It appears that a degree of expansion and modernization of capacity
began in several of India's key manufacturing centers in the months prior to the
ending of quotas, as some suppliers anticipated the requirements of the postquota world. For example, in Tirupur - the self-styled "Manchester of India" manufacturers invested heavily in state-of-the-art machinery from Taiwan,
Germany, Japan, Italy, the UK and the U.S., as well as in processing and
production facilities.211 In addition, a number of the apparel manufacturers in
Tirupur have established vertically integrated manufacturing facilities. The
Royal Classic Group, for example, which has been operating in Tirupur since
1991, has established contract farms for growing the cotton it will use in its
apparel factories, and anticipates expanding cotton production from 2,000 to
8,000 acres.212 Additionally, Royal Classic has established its own spinning
plant. 213 The Tirupur Exporters Association opened the Netaji Apparel Park,
India's first dedicated apparel park, spread over 180 acres off highway 47,
where it was hoped that over 50 companies would build facilities.21 4 In
Bangalore, big textile companies like the Ahmedabad-based Arvind Mills and
the Mumbai-based
Raymond, have set up new factories to make and export
215
clothing.
Nevertheless, Indian manufacturers were on the whole extremely
cautious to add capacity in anticipation of the end of quotas, and were therefore

Jan. 2005, available at http://www.cpiml.org/liberation/year_-2005/january/mfaregime.htm(last
visited April 1, 2006).
21 Prystay, supra note 195.
211 V. Sridhar, Towards New Frontiers, FRONTLINE, Nov. 6-19, 2004, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2123/stories/20041119003710500.htm (last visited April 1,
2006). (The recent reliance on more expensive but more efficient and versatile foreign machinery
has been a severe blow to domestic Indian manufacturers of apparel machinery. Though Indian
machines cost only a fraction of the foreign brands, the imported machines offer productivity levels
that are six or seven times greater than the Indian machines. In addition, the foreign machines
permit more complicated designs, including computerized jacquards. It is estimated that Indian
apparel producers have imported close to 10,000 machines in the past decade. Some observers have
stated that Indian machine producers from Ludhiana, which used to dominate the Indian market, are
now "finished.")
212 Id.
213

Id.

214 T.

Surendar, Textiles: The Big FactoriesAre Coming, BUSINESSWORLD, Nov. 15, 2004,

available at http://www.businessworldindia.com/nov1504/index.asp (last visited April 1, 2006).
215 Id.
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not in a position to take full advantage of the ending of the MFA quota-regime
in early 2005. Manufacturers point to restrictive labor laws to explain their
initially overly-cautious reluctance to add capacity. 2 16

In particular, they

complain, they are forbidden under Indian labor law from hiring contract labor,
217
and once employees are hired it is "almost impossible to fire" them.
Additionally, laws designed to guarantee stable employment to India's workers,
make the closure of unwanted factories extraordinarily difficult. 218

Many

manufacturers, like Chennai-based Harbinger Singh, managing director of
Roverco Apparel Ltd., delayed expanding his facilities and hiring more
workers, out of concern that if he added capacity and the quota-system was
extended or the anticipated boom did not materialize, he would have been left
with unwanted factories he could not close and workers he could not fire.21 9
When the MFA quota system did indeed expire, and the increase in orders
materialized, Singh and others scrambled to "play catch-up" and add capacity.
Singh, for example, built two new factories, which opened in June 2005.220
Arvind Singhar, a textile industry consultant for KSA Technopak, a New Delhi
textile-consulting firm, has estimated that Indian companies will invest upwards
of US$5 billion in capacity in 2006-2007.221 In the meantime, EU and U.S.
222
buyers have been told to wait months to place and receive their orders.
Undoubtedly, many simply turned to China. As Indian manufacturers gradually
ramped-up production by mid to late 2005, exports to the U.S. and EU
improved markedly. In the first seven months of 2005, Indian exports to those
markets increased 29 percent compared to the same period in 2004, to US$4.9
billion.223 Nevertheless, there is a sense that India, unlike China, missed a
golden opportunity because of its failure to position itself properly to take full
advantage of the end of quotas.
Aside from inflexible labor laws and a conservative and cautious
investment profile amongst its manufacturers, several other hurdles remain for
India to become and remain competitive with China. The size of India's new
factories, though much larger than the traditional facilities, are still much
smaller than those in China.224 Even the biggest companies like Raymond and
Prystay, supra note 195.
Id.
218 Prystay, supra note 195. See also George Iype, Boom Time ForIndian Textiles, at
216
217

http://in.rediff.com/money/2005/feb/lOspec.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
219Prystay, supra note 195.
220 Id.
221

Id.

222

Id.

223 Prystay,
22

supra note 195.

Surendar, supranote 214.
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Arvind Mills, for example, are building factories that are just a tenth the size of
the newest facilities in China.225 Gokuldas Images, India's largest exporter, has
1,000 sewing machines in its largest factory. 226 In comparison, medium-sized
factories in China have 2,000 machines, with large factories having 10,000
machines in one location. 227 Productivity is lower in India than
in China, whose
228
labor productivity in the garment industry leads the industry.

Indian infrastructure, in sharp contrast with China, is inefficient,
poorly maintained, and frequently inadequate. As one observer has noted:
Overseas buyers and domestic suppliers all have their own
horror tales of delayed shipments due to the deplorable
congestion at Indian ports, the sordid conditions of roads from
the manufacturing centres to the shipment points leading to
consignments stranded in broken-down vehicles, traffic
choke-ups at the numerous collection centres.229
India lacks a deep-water port, meaning that the largest container ships are
unable to dock directly. 230 Instead, "feeder vessels" carry Indian products to be
transferred to a "mother ship" in some other port.23' Loading ships in Indian
ports can take from eight days to several weeks.232 Moreover, goods are
required to be at Indian ports seven days prior to shipment.233 As Kaushik Basu
has noted, "In most East Asian ports the cut-off is [only] one day. 234 Indian
ports are small and hampered by bureaucratic and logistical delays. Typically,
for a product to travel from factory in India to retail outlet in New York takes
around 30 days.235 Most East Asian countries take half that time. 6 In
225

id.

226

Id.

227

Id.

228 It

has been estimated, for example, that it takes 22.2 minutes to produce a cotton shirt in India,

compared with just 12.5 minutes to produce the identical shirt in China. Edward Luce and Richard
McGregor, A Share of the Spoils: Beiing andNew Delhi Get Mutual Benefits From Growing Trade,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, at 17.
229Prystay, supra note 195; Indian Garments in a Brave New World, domain-b.com (The
Information Company) Dec. 24, 2005,
http://www/domainb.com/industry/textiles/20041229_newworld.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
230 Basu, supranote 3.
231

Id.

Madhukar, supra note 199.
Basu, supra note 3.
234 Id.
232
233
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Id.

236

Id.
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December 2004, Ratna Rao, a Delhi-based buying agent for the garment
industry in the U.S. and the EU, expressed frustration with the failure of the
Indian Government to anticipated necessary logistical improvements:
The government hasn't done any clear planning. Have we
increased our facilities to take extra cargo?...Currently,
there's always a backlog. We need to up-grade port facilities,
we need to up-grade our airports. This entire logistics
position has not been looked into. China has had the foresight
to look at these issues, but not India.237
Nevertheless, India has several advantages that may help it to remain
competitive. First, as a major producer of cotton, it can offer reduced shipment
costs to buyers; second, Indian exporters are finally expanding and up-grading
their manufacturing capacities in order to avail itself of economies of scale;
third, India offers plentiful and cheap labor; and fourth, India offers a stable
second source of supply to those foreign buyers who are concerned about over38
relying on China (so-called "geographical derisking" or diversification).,
India, it has been noted, offers the advantage of a stable democratic government
and a highly developed fashion industry. 9 Moreover, the agreements between
China and the EU and the U.S. at the end of 2005 to cap export growth may buy
Indian companies time to build capacity. Indeed, the new caps on Chinese
exports are, to some observers, "a godsend for India." 240
Indian labor activists remain profoundly concerned about the
consequences of the changing face of the Indian apparel and textile industries,
and in particular the decline of small-scale producers. 24' There is a belief that
employer demands for increased global competitiveness will be used as an
excuse to drive down wages, undermine job security, and repeal laws
237

Pandey, supra note 188.

In 2002, foreign buyers shifted orders from China to India as a result of the slow-down of
production in China as a result of the SARS epidemic. The SARS epidemic highlighted for buyers
the value of"de-risking" their sourcing strategy. Surendar, supra note 214. "The SARS outbreak in
China in 2004 affected the apparel industry severely, sending buyers to build linkages with India
and nations less affected by the outbreak." Madhukar, supra note 199.
239 Madhukar, supra note 199.
240 Prystay, supra note 195 (quoting Jal Irani, a textile analyst at Macquarie Securities in Mumbai).
24' For a discussion of the potential negative impacts of global economic integration on the Indian
238

garment industry, see Jayati Ghosh, Waitingfor the Boom, Frontline, Jan. 29-Feb. 11,2005,
available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2203/stories/20050211002309500.htm (last visited
April 1, 2006); Sujana Krishnamoorthy et al., Structure of the Garments Industry and Labor Rights
in India: The Post MFA Context, Study for the Centre for Education and Communication in New
Delhi (2004).
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guaranteeing worker and union rights.242 There have been demands by
employers, for example, that work stoppages and strikes be banned and that 12hour workdays without overtime should be permitted.243 The CPIML, an Indian
trade union, has warned that:
The future of independent fabricators is at the mercy of the
people who control the assembly line production ... A new

breed of monopoly traders come to control the entire industry
with their large capital and the rest of us are at their mercy.
This new breed cares for nothing but super profits. There are
also demands to keep the role of state intervention at its
minimum so that the market that is under the complete
command of the monopoly capital can call the shots.244
China:
Ira Kalish has noted that "China casts a giant shadow., 245 It is very
much the 800-pound gorilla of the global trade in textiles and garments. In
1990, China accounted for 9% of global apparel exports; by 2002, this share had
risen to 20.6%.246 Similarly, in 1990, China accounted for 6.9% of the global
exports in textiles; but by 2002 its share had increased to 13.5%.247 No other
country accounted for more than 5% of the global trade in 2002.248 In contrast
to the rise of China, between 1990 and 2002, the global share of textile and

242

Shankar, supra note 209.

243

Id.

244 Id.
245

Kalish, supra note 20, at 2. Since beginning the reforms started in the late 1970's, which have

included the restructuring of the economy and resulting efficiency gains, China has averaged 9.4
percent annual GDP growth. In 1978, China accounted for less than one percent of the world
economy, and its foreign trade amounted to US$20.6 billion. By 2005, China accounted for four
percent of the world economy, with foreign trade worth US$851 billion, the third-largest national
total. Zheng Bijian, China's "PeacefulRise"to Great-PowerStatus, Foreign Affairs (Sept./Oct.
2005) at http://foreignaffairs.org.20050901 faessay84502/zheng-bijian/china-s-peaceful-rise-togreat-power-status.html. (last visited April 26, 2006) China's industrial growth rate was estimated at
27.7 percent in 2005. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, China in 2005 was the
second-largest economy in the world after the U.S. CIA, THE WORLD FACT BOOK, CHINA at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/chhtml (last visited
April 25, 2006).
246 Id. at 1.
247 Kalish, supra note 20, at 1.
248
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apparel exports from the EU had declined by more than 10%.249
This increase of China's role in the global trade of textiles and
garments has come as the result of massive investment in modem
manufacturing capacity which has resulted in very high labor productivity.
Combined with relatively low labor costs, the high Chinese productivity has
resulted in low unit labor costs.2 501n the space of fifteen years, China has
achieved extraordinary efficiency as a result of a campaign of capital
investment in capacity, the creation of a highly efficient transportation and
utility infrastructure, economies of scale, and favorable government regulations
including avoiding currency contagion with capital currency controls.251 Even
under the more restrictive quota regime, China had become the biggest apparel
and textile exporter in the world.252
The Chinese Government has opened large areas near the coast for
industrial development, forming giant industrial parks, offering tax benefits, and
building infrastructure and transportation networks.253 The degree of vertical
integration (fibre-to-yam-to-fabric-to-garment
manufacturing
in
easy
geographic proximity) and economic specialization of these "lump economy"
cities is remarkable. Entire cities have been constructed on land which was,
until recently, rice fields whose factories produce nothing except one specific
type of clothing for export.254 The city of Datang, in the Yangtze River Delta of
coastal China, for example, had been a small town of barely 1,000 people in the
late 1970's.255 Today, it is known to buyers around the world as "Sock City,"
whose factories produce an astonishing nine billion pairs of socks a year.256
Over 100,000 buyers from around the world place sock orders in Datang
annually.257 The Yangtze River Delta has several giant specialty cities, such
249

Id.

250

Id.

251
252

id.
Kalish, supra note 20, at 2. Despite China's rapid expansion of productivity and manufacturing

capacity during the 1990's, its exports were limited by the system of quotas. China's share of the
U.S. apparel market, for example, remained steady, with its share increasing only from 15% of U.S.
apparel imports in 1995, to 16% in 2002. China's share of E.U. apparel imports rose somewhat
more rapidly, from 14% in 1995 to 20% in 2002. The growth in China's share of the global trade
occurred in exports to other important markets. From 1995-2002, for example, China's share of
Japan's apparel imports rose from 59.1% to 77.5%, in part as Japanese retailers showed willingness
to purchase apparel from China. Kalish, supra note 20 at 2-3.
253 David Barboza, In Roaring China, Sweaters are West of Socks City, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 2004,
at Al.
25 id.
255Id.
256 Id.
257

Id.
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"International Necktie City," "Sweater City," "Knit Clothing City," and
"Underwear City," whose factories can accommodate even the largest of
orders.258 Quite simply, with such vast economies of scale, and with billions of
dollars invested in new facilities, modem manufacturing equipment,
infrastructure, transportation, port facilities, and supporting industries, China
has become the world's "garment behemoth. 259
China has benefited from a vast untapped labor force and low wages "averaging from 15 to 86 cents an hour in the garment industry, by various
estimates." 26° Chinese manufacturers have also undoubtedly benefited from the
governmental suppression of independent trade unions and the system of
internal passports that deprives migrant workers, who form the majority of the
export-manufacturing labor force, of many basic rights.2 6' An AFL-CIO trade
petition, prepared by Mark Barenberg of Columbia University Law School,
argues that "repression of workers' rights lowers Chinese wages by 47 to 86
percent. 2 62 The China Business Review has noted that
[i]n practice. . .the rights of Chinese workers are routinely
violated. Workers are often required to work far more than 40
hours a week, have few days off, are paid below the minimum
wage, and are not paid required overtime.
Improper
deductions from wages are common ...Physical abuse of
workers, 263and dangerous working conditions, are also
common.

China's regime suppresses any attempt at collective bargaining by free
trade unions, while subjecting migrant workers to a system in which they have
no bargaining power as individuals. It has been estimated that if labor rights

258

Barboza, supra note 253.

259

Id.

260

David Moberg, TradingDown, THE NATION, Jan. 10, 2005, available at

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050110/moberg (last visited April 1, 2006). The current labor
force in China is estimated to be 791 million, with approximately half employed in agriculture and
the rest largely divided between the industrial and service sectors. The CIA has estimated that from
100 to 150 million surplus rural workers are adrift between the villages and the cities, many
subsisting through part-time, low-paying jobs. CIA, THE WORLD FACT BOOK,CHINA at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited April 26, 2006). China's
population, currently believed to be 1.3 billion, is anticipated to rise to 1.5 billion by 2030. Bijian,
supra note 245.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263Robert J. Rosoff, Beyond Codes of Conduct: Addressing Labor Rights Problems in China, 44
CHINA BusINEss REVIEW, (March 2004).
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were enforced in China, manufacturing costs would rise between ten and
seventy-seven percent. 264 In contrast, the official position of the Chinese
Government has been to stress the positive economic benefits of the rise of
Chinese manufacturing. Zhang Dejiang, a member of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China, for example, has noted that in the province of
Guangdong alone, 400 million Chinese have been raised to middle-class status
in the last two decades, ushering in the biggest social and economic
transformation in modem times. 265
China offers manufacturers the significant advantage of being able to
offer all stages of production (harvesting raw materials, weaving, textile
manufacture, dyeing, processing, cutting, sewing and knitting, packaging, and
distribution), combined with staggering economies of scale, high productivity
and low unit cost. 266 Given the all too obvious competitive advantage held by
China over most other producing nations, it is not surprising that prior to
January 1, 2005, many textile and garment companies were actively building
new production capacity in anticipation of the post MFA quota era. In 2003, for
example, foreign direct investment in China's textile and garment industry was
US$4.4 billion.267 Taiwanese investment in China's garment and textile sector
rose 261% from 2000 to 2002.268 It is generally expected that the freer trade
system promised with the elimination of the MFA quotas and the integration of
textiles and garments into the regular GATT system, will facilitate a substantial
increase in the importance of China.269
Niall Ferguson, the Laurence A. Tisch professor of history at Harvard
University, has urged Western nations to "wake up and smell the green tea."
"China has," he suggests, "the most dynamic economy in the world and quite
possibly in all history. 270 European Union finance leaders, Ferguson suggests,
complacently assume that the E.U.'s economic strength relative to China is not
in question.271 In fact, he argues, Europe is threatened with becoming the "sick
man" of the developed world, whose world influence is further hindered by a
272
weak military capacity and a lack of significant energy reserves.
264

Jonathan P. Hiatt and Deborah Greenfield, The Importance of Core Labor Rights in World

Development, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 39, 50 (2004).
265 Fibre2Fashion Web site, supra note 119.
266 Kalish, supra note 20, at 4.
267
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Id.
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Id.
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Niall Ferguson, Wake Up and Smell the Green Tea, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005 at B 11,available

at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
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Though Ferguson's premise of the complacent decline of the EU may
be premature, his comments about the formidable growth of the Chinese
economy have merit. Frank Verrastro, an energy specialist at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington and a former White House
advisor, has argued that, taking into account Asia's economic expansion,
population growth, and increased diplomatic influence, "I don't see how you
273
can get away from the theory that the center of the world is moving east.,
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo Yong Boon has echoed this
sentiment: "If we don't go mad and start to fight each other, then I believe the
center of gravity of world civilization will shift to Asia during this century. 274
In September 2005, the U.S. trade deficit swelled to US$66.1 billion,
an
representing an 11.4% increase from the previous month, in part driven by 275
oil price hike after Hurricane Katrina, and a labor dispute at Boeing Co.
Nevertheless, the politically-sensitive trade deficit with China continued its
upward movement, and reached an all-time high of US$20.1 billion in
September 2005.276 In October 2005, China reported a trade surplus of US$12
billion. 277 In February 2006, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported that
the U.S. trade deficit in goods and services reached a record level of US$726
billion in 2005, an 18 percent increase over 2004, while the U.S. merchandise
deficit alone, which excludes services, was US$782 billion in 2005, also an 18
percent increase. 278 China's trade surplus with the U.S. increased 24.5% to a
record US$202 billion.279 U.S. politicians and business lobby groups have
accused China of gaining a trade advantage by keeping its currency artificially
weak. 280 Despite calls from Washington for greater currency flexibility, Beijing

273

Marshall, supra note 192, at A18.
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Id.

275 Reuters, Trade Gap Grows to $66 Billion as Exports Fall, Oil PricesRise, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11,

2005 at C3.
276

Id.

277 Id.
278

Robert E. Scott, Economic Policy Institute, Rapid Growth in Oil Prices, Chinese Imports Pump

Up TradeDeficit to New Record, TRADE PICTURE, Feb. 10, 2006,
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfmi/webfeatures-econindicators-tradepict200602l0 (last visited
April 1, 2006).
279 Id.
280 "Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., and Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C. have threatened legislation
that would impose tariffs of 27.5 percent on Chinese exports unless Beijing agrees to dramatically
raise the value of its currency... [and] Sen. Max Baucus, D-Mont., a top ranking Democrat on the
Senate Finance Committee, warned ...that Congress would pass legislation to punish Beijing unless
China worked to end the trade imbalance and further revalue its currency." Donna Borak, China 's
Reserves Rise, Causeof U.S. Worry, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan. 16, 2006, at
http://www.upi.com/Internationallntelligence/view.php? StorylD=20060116-041130-4588r. (last

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol5/iss1/1

40

Hall: "China Casts a Giant Shadow:" The Developing World Confronts Trad

CHINA CASTS A GIANT SHADOW

has affirmed its policy of keeping the yuan steady.281 China currently holds
more than $260 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds, and its heavy investment in the
U.S. national debt is an important component of America's ability to fund a
record trade deficit during a period of virtually non-existent U.S. domestic
savings.28 2 China now has an estimated US$818.9 billion in currency reserves,
and added $50 billion in reserves in just the last quarter of 2005.283 Indeed,
China is expected to accumulate more than $1,000 billion in currency reserves
by the end of 2006, becoming the world's largest holder of foreign currency.284
China's world trade surplus reached US$102 billion last year, capping an
average growth rate of 9.9 percent between 1993 and 2004.85
How the government in Beijing is choosing to spend its new-found
wealth is also causing concern in the West. Beijing is, for example, currently
investing heavily in a controversial program of military modernization
presumably intended to buttress China's ability to assert itself in international
diplomacy and project China's power and prestige regionally. During an
October 2005 visit to Beijing, U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld bluntly warned
that Beijing's decision to quickly modernize its military arsenal is cause for
concern: "As you know, it raises some questions about whether China will
make the right choices
- choices that will serve the world's interests in regional
286
peace and stability.,

visited April 1, 2006); See also US Could Get Tougher on China Trade Issues in 2006,
TDCTRADE.COM, Jan. 26, 2005, at
http://www.tdctrade.com/alert/us06O2.htm?wt source-tdc&wt-type-textlink&wt-placem. (last
visited April 1, 2006).
281 Reuters, supra note 275.
282 From T-shirts to T-Bonds-Chinaand the World Economy, THE ECONOMIST, July 30, 2005, at
61.
283 Donna Borak, China'sReserves Rise, Cause of U.S. Worry, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL,
Jan. 16, 2006, at http://www.upi.com/Intemationallntelligence/view.php?StorylD=20060116041130-4588r. (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
284 Id.
285 Id.
286Mark Mazzetti, Rumsfeld Urges New PoliticalDirectionfor China, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005,
at A3. (The enormous investment made by Beijing in China's military capacity - the scale of which
has been made possible by the success of China's participation in the global economy - has
provoked particular concern in Washington. In a July 2005 report, the Pentagon suggested that
China may be spending $90 billion a year on its military budget, three times the amount officially
acknowledged by Beijing. This estimate is disputed by Beijing. Nevertheless, China's military
spending could have profound regional consequences. The Pentagon report concluded that China
may pose "a credible threat to modem militaries operating in the region ...
[and that Beijing] may
be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance
security interests, or resolve disputes.") While the dispute between mainland China and Taiwan
provides one deeply troubling scenario for a potential U.S.-China military confrontation, the greatly

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

41

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

During his October 2005 Beijing trip, Secretary Rumsfeld echoed
themes previously articulated by the Bush administration: that China must
become more democratic and politically open; it must abide by accepted norms
of the largely free-market, democratic international economic system that has
facilitated its growth; and it must play a bigger role in combating international
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, disease and other threats to global stability.2 87
Rumsfeld specifically warned that China's long-term economic growth could
depend on that nation's willingness to accept greater democracy: "China's
future prosperity, and to some degree the future of other nations' attitudes
[about China], may well depend on internal events [within China]., 288 What is
clear is that the United States is no longer the sole power that many nations look
to for trade and protection.289
CONCLUSIONS:
Clearly, as USAID has concluded, "the garment sourcing wars are in
full swing and will remain unsettled for some time., 290 What perhaps is most
surprising is that what is occurring globally can indeed properly be described as
a war rather than merely a rout. Developing countries have not been swept
from the field (at least not yet), and indeed have secured some victories. It
remains to be seen, however, whether they can win the war, or whether their
successes will be no more than temporary holding actions during an inevitable
retreat in the face of overwhelming odds. With current uncertainties associated
with China's supply because of the potential reintroduction of safeguards by the
U.S. and the EU, buyers will likely continue to hedge their bets by continuing to
diversify their sourcing. This has undoubtedly created breathing space for
developing countries, and has somewhat tempered the potentially devastating
impact of the end of MFA quotas on those countries. However, the safeguards
are temporary and cannot last indefinitely. The question for producers
throughout the developing world is whether they can be cost-competitive when
the safeguards are finally lifted.
Cambodia offers one possible model for producing nations searching
for ways to protect their fledgling apparel industries from Chinese competition.

expanded military capacity of China patently challenges the automatic assumption of American
military supremacy in the Pacific that has survived largely unquestioned since the end of the Second
World War.
287
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290
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Cambodia, though undoubtedly a cheap place to produce apparel, has chosen to
foster an image as a "sweatshop-free" producer rather than simply drive down
wages and costs in an attempt to remain cost-competitive with China. The
Cambodian Government has decided instead to continue a program of
independent factory monitoring carried out by the ILO, which appears to have
genuinely improved factory conditions and labor compliance.
Though
Cambodia still faces enormous problems associated with corruption and
bureaucratic inefficiency, foreign buyers appear to have responded well to
Cambodia's attempts to improve labor and factory conditions. The higher labor
standards offered by Cambodian producers, it appears, is attractive to Western
buyers sensitive to accusations that their products are manufactured in
sweatshop conditions. Indeed, Cambodia appears to have directly benefited
from media reports of poor labor standards elsewhere, and its reputation as a
safe-haven for fair labor standards has attracted international retailers concerned
about consumer backlash. Whether the Cambodian model will remain merely a
niche for a tiny portion of producing countries, however, remains to be seen.
In today's global economy, international corporate mega-buyers like
Wal-Mart are largely turning to those manufacturing nations able to undercut
their competitors .291 The vulnerability of developing nations to decisions made
by corporate boards tens of thousands of miles away, and the very real
possibility that production will shortly concentrate in a tiny handful of
producing nations, suggests that global free trade alone may not offer the path
to widespread global development once anticipated, and that, rather, free trade
leads to growth but maldistribution.
The international marketplace is
increasingly dominated by companies seeking little beyond lowering production
291 See Ted C. Fishman, How China Will Change Your Business, INC. MAGAZINE, March 2005,

available at http://www.inc.com/magazine/20050301/china.html (last visited April 1, 2006)("[N]o
company has been a bigger catalyst in pushing manufacturers to China," or to embracing the
potential of large-scale manufacturing in China than Wal-Mart. "In 2003, Wal-Mart purchased $15
billion worth of goods from Chinese suppliers." Wal-Mart accounts for 10-13 percent of all
Chinese exports to the U.S. More than 80 percent of Wal-Mart's worldwide suppliers are in
China.); See Rosen The Wal-Mart Effect: The World Trade Organizationand the Race to the

Bottom, supra note 5, at 273. ("Over the past decade, the symbiotic relationship between Wal-Mart
and China has become one of the most significant in the retail industry ... The company uses its
power to drive down prices among American suppliers, which are often encouraged to relocate to
China as a method of reducing wages and pricing."); See also, Pete Engardio and Dexter Roberts,
The China Price,BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 6, 2004, at 102 available at

http://businessweek.com/magazine/content/04__49b3911401.htm (last visited April 1, 2006)
(Stating it is China's willingness to please big retailers, and they are "better suppliers" is the reason
many big retailers like Wal-Mart have deals with Chinese manufacturing); and Jian Jingjing, WalMart's China Inventory to Hit US $18b This Year, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 29 2004, available at

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/29/content_395728.htm (last visited April 1,
2006).
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costs and with little interest in the social and political consequences of their
corporate decisions. Though nation states and international bodies may have
reason to address issues of global poverty and economic dislocation, most
corporate boards have little reason to do so. And yet it is these corporate boards
- who have little stake in the societies or cultures from where they purchase
their products - who are making the decisions that directly effect the lives of
millions of the world's poorest workers.
The vulnerability of developing nations to large-scale and rapid
market-driven shifts in global production is clear. Yet there may also be a cost
to the West. While the shift of production may be interpreted by some
observers merely as a natural reward for efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and
competitiveness in a liberalized global trade regime, it is not without potentially
catastrophic and unanticipated consequences for Western consuming nations.
First, and most obviously, the end of quotas seems likely to result in the
systematic rise of a handful of super producers: nations able through economies
of scale to dominate the global marketplace. It should not be assumed that the
United States or EU countries will be among these nations. In the case of
China, in particular, there is reason to be concerned that the unprecedented
expansion of wealth and manufacturing capacity in that nation will result in the
rise of an economic global superpower, with political, fiscal and military
implications both regionally and internationally that are hard to predict and
292
which are not necessarily beneficial to the West.

292As China becomes an increasingly important and influential participant in the global economy, it
has sought to secure access to the raw materials needed to support its continued expansion. China's
oil needs, for example, are expected to double in the next two decades to over 14 million barrels a
day. Marshall, supra note 192, at A 18. The China National Petroleum Corporation is now involved
in forty projects in thirty-two countries. See Vega, supra note 11, at 387 fh. 79. China is actively
attempting to expand its diplomatic and political influence over nations which can provide the raw
materials upon which China is dependent, and is increasingly following a policy of direct
investment in infrastructure and energy projects in those nations. Inevitably, this is placing Beijing
in competition with Washington for political and economic influence in many regions around the
globe, from Central Asia to Africa. China's influence is even increasingly surfacing in the produce
and oil-rich nations of Latin America - long considered America's "Backyard." In a late 2004 trip
to Argentina, Chile, Cuba and Brazil, Chinese President Hu Jintao promised tens of billions of
dollars to improve the region's infrastructure. Mark Magnier, U.S. Is Watching China 's Latin
American Moves" LA TIMES, April 15, 2006, at A 14. See also Vega, supra note 11, at 377-378. It
has been suggested that the closer political and economic ties between China and Latin America
may undermine U.S. ability to secure regional cooperation in initiatives in trade, human rights,
antinarcotics, and environmental safeguards - interests simply not shared by Beijing - as Latin
American countries feel less need to cooperate with Washington. See Vega, supra note I1, at 377378. U.S. efforts to promote democratic reform in Central Asia have similarly been undermined by
the rising influence of China, including the building of an oil pipeline running thousands of miles
from the Kazakh oil fields in the northern Caspian to China. Marshall, supra note 192, at Al.
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Beijing's direct economic influence is extending around the globe, from the Sudan, to Iran, to Latin
America, and is often matched by diplomatic campaigns aimed at extending China's political
influence over energy- and raw product-rich nations. These include countries ambivalent - or even
actively hostile - towards the Bush administration and content not to be pressed on such issues as
human rights, democracy, civil society, and governmental transparency. China has, for example,
taken advantage of anti-American hostility in Latin America to further its own influence in the
region. China's economic and political ties with Latin America have increased enormously since
2000. Nearly half of all China's foreign direct investment goes to Latin America, a figure Chinese
officials estimate will reach $100 billion by 2010, while Latin American trade with China grew to
$50 billion- a fourfold increase from 2000 to 2005. Magnier at A14. In 2004, Latin America had
one of its better economic performances, with much of that growth coming not from trade with the
United States but from rapidly expanding sales of raw materials to China, rather than trade with the
United States. See Larry Rohter, Bush Faces Tough Times in South America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2005 at A12. Beijing is not just purchasing oil and raw commodities from Latin America, it is
becoming actively and directly involved in oil extraction, transportation and infrastructure
construction. Brazil is China's largest trading partner in Latin America, and bilateral trade between
them tripled between 2000 and 2004. Vega, supra note 11, at 388. Brazilian exports (primarily oil
and soy beans) to China reached US$1.1 billion in the first quarter of 2004, with expectations that
the trade could reach US$10 billion in 2005. Vega, supra note 11, at 388 fns. 81-82. Chinese
businesses are actively seeking Brazilian partners in economic sectors such as oil and agriculture,
and Beijing has discussed directly investing between US$3 billion to US$4 billion in Brazilian
transportation, refineries and other infrastructure, including a railway project connecting Brazil to
the Pacific ports of Chile. Vega, supranote 11, at 388. In Argentina, China is also seeking to
become investment partners in the infrastructure and transportation sector. Vega, supra note 11, at
388. Argentine President, Nestor Kirchner, and Chinese President, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement
on June 28, 2004, under which China will begin investing in joint projects in Argentina, including a
railway construction project, and Argentina will begin exporting citrus crops to China. Vega, supra
note 11, at 388. China and Chile have entered into trade agreements permitting export to China of
Chile's citrus harvest. Chile, China Review Joint FTA Economic Study Progress,LATIN AM. NEWS
DIG., June 4, 2004. Even in Mexico, whose factories have been hit hard by Chinese manufacturing
competition, the government has decided to increase its production of oil specifically to satisfy
China's demand. Vega, supra note 11, at 388. "China has also indicated interest in [direct
investment of US] $3 billion in Ecuador, primarily in its oil sector." Vega, supranote 11, at 388.
In Nicaragua, with the construction of a canal; and in Guyana, which now enjoys bilateral economic
and technical cooperation with China. Vega, supra note 11, at 389. Venezuela poses a particular
headache for the U.S., as its leftist president, Hugo Chavez, has actively pursued policies built upon
a foundation of popular anti-Americanism and a deep-seated distrust of Washington. Venezuela's
Foreign Minister, met with managers of China National Petroleum Corporation... in order to
establish a strategic alliance over the exploration, transformation and transportation of crude oil,
including modernizing and upgrading necessary infrastructure. Vega, supranote 11, at 389. The
growing influence of China in Latin America is of significance. The failure of the U.S. to maintain
its hegemony in the region, combined with growing links between Latin American governments and
Beijing, might suggest that the U.S. is losing influence even within the region long known as
"America' back-yard." See Richard E. Friedman, Letter From the Publisher,NAT'L STRATEGY F.
REv., Fall 2004, at 4, available at http://www.nationalstrategy.com/Fall%202004.pdf (last visited
April 1, 2006). The rise of China in Latin America may ultimately threaten the ability of the U.S. to
guarantee its future access to Latin American oil reserves, a matter of national security and of
profound economic consequence. Vega, supranote 11 at 391. Washington is described as
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As Tyler Marshall of the Los Angeles Times has noted:
As the Bush administration struggles to combat the threat of
international terrorism, a far quieter force is challenging
America's global influence: the growing economic clout of
Asia. Increasingly, other nations have become captivated by
the reality, and the potential, of fast developing commercial
ties with the East. Suddenly, America is no longer the only
guarantor of their293economic viability or their political
protector of choice.
The shift of production may have other largely unanticipated
consequences. The Western search for ever-cheaper sources of production may
suggest to many that Westerners view the developing world as little more than a
readily exploitable source of cheap labor. At this moment in history, when
Western political, economic and democratic values are confronted by an
increasingly violent anti-Western and Anti-American world view, a perception
that Westerners have no interest in the often appalling consequences of their
search for ever-cheaper consumer products, cannot best serve Western security
or political interests. Put simply, anti-Western resentment, coupled with
extreme poverty and social injustice, will fuel instability, anger and violence.
At the very least, consuming nations should act to ameliorate the worst
consequences of sudden shifts in global production. Given the vital importance
of international economic stability, Western states should pursue trade
agreements intended to limit extreme national or regional shifts in production of
the sort we may currently be witnessing in garment and textile manufacturing,
and to set a floor for the market with reference to international labor standards.
In that way, Western nations can transform their image from one of selfcentered consumer-driven indifference, to one of concerned partner with the
world's poorest and most vulnerable nations.

increasingly "attentive" to China's military-related activities in Latin America which, as Army Gen.
Bantz J. Craddock told a Senate Armed Services Committee, involve "more and more Chinese nonlethal equipment," Chinese military missions in nearly 20 Latin American countries, and an
increasing number of Latin American military offices receiving training in China. Magnier at A14.
293 Marshall, supra note 192 at Al.
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